

THE MEANING OF Κεφαλή ("HEAD"):
A RESPONSE TO RECENT STUDIES*

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In a previous issue of *Trinity Journal* Richard S. Cervin published a critique¹ of my 1985 article, "Does Κεφαλή ('Head') Mean 'Source' or 'Authority Over' in Greek Literature? A Survey of 2,336 Examples."² My primary purpose in this present article is to respond to the critique given by Mr. Cervin, but I shall also interact with a number of other studies of κεφαλή that have been published since my 1985 work (especially those of Berkeley and Alvera Mickelsen, Philip Payne, Gilbert Bilezikian, and Katherine Kroeger).

By way of introduction, it may be said that this issue is of considerable interest today because of its relevance for the discussion of women's and men's roles in marriage. What does the NT mean when it says that "the husband is the *head* of the wife as Christ is the *head* of the church?" (Eph 5:23), or that the "*head* of every man is Christ" and "the *head* of a woman is the man" (1 Cor 11:3)? Christians throughout history have usually understood the word "head" in these verses to mean "authority over," but many authors have denied that in the last few years, claiming instead that "head" in these contexts means "source" or "origin," so that Christ is the *source* of every man, Christ is the *source* of the church, and — referring to Adam and Eve — the man is the *source* of the woman. Support for this view was claimed from some occurrences of the Greek word κεφαλή, outside the NT, where it was said to take the meaning "source." Furthermore, some argued that the sense "authority over" was uncommon or unknown in Greek and would have been unintelligible to Paul's readers. (Mr. Cervin's recent article

*This article also appears as an appendix to *Recovering Biblical Manhood and Womanhood*, ed., John Piper and Wayne Grudem (Westchester: Crossway, forthcoming).

¹Richard S. Cervin, "Does Κεφαλή Mean 'Source' or 'Authority' in Greek Literature? A Rebuttal," *TrinJ* 10 NS (1989) 85-112.

²*TrinJ* 6 NS (1985) 38-59; reprinted from the appendix of *The Role Relationship of Men and Women*, by George W. Knight III (revised ed., Chicago: Moody Press, 1985) 49-80.

also denied the meaning "authority over" in these texts, but he proposed not "source" but "preeminence" as an alternative meaning.)

I. BRIEF SUMMARY OF MY 1985 ARTICLE

My original article attempted to respond to these claims by making the following points:

- (1) The evidence to support the claim that κεφαλή can mean "source" is surprisingly weak, and in fact unpersuasive.
 - (a) All the articles and commentaries depend on only two examples of κεφαλή in ancient literature: Herodotus 4.91 and *Orphic Fragments* 21a, both of which come from more than four hundred years before the time of the NT, and both of which fail to be convincing examples. Herodotus 4.91 simply shows that κεφαλή can refer to the "end points" of a river — in this case, the sources of a river, but elsewhere, the mouth of a river — and since "end point" is a commonly recognized and well-attested sense of κεφαλή, we do not have convincing evidence that "source" is the required sense here. The other text, *Orphic Fragments* 21a, calls Zeus the "head" of all things, but in a context where it is impossible to tell whether it means "first one, beginning" (an acknowledged meaning for κεφαλή) or "source" (a meaning not otherwise attested).
 - (b) A new search of 2,336 examples of κεφαλή from a wide range of ancient Greek literature produced no convincing examples where κεφαλή meant "source."
- (2) The evidence to support the claim that κεφαλή can mean "authority over" is substantial.
 - (a) All the major lexicons that specialize in the NT period give this meaning (whereas none gives the meaning "source").
 - (b) The omission of the meaning "authority over" from the Liddell-Scott lexicon is an oversight that should be corrected (but it should be noted that that lexicon does not specialize in the NT period).
 - (c) The search of 2,336 examples turned up forty-nine texts where κεφαλή had the meaning "person of superior authority or rank, or 'ruler,' 'ruling part'"; therefore, this was an acceptable and understandable sense for κεφαλή at the time of the NT.
 - (d) The meaning "authority over" best suits many NT contexts.

II. RESPONSE TO RICHARD CERVIN

At the outset it should be said that, even if I were to agree with all of Mr. Cervin's article (which is certainly not the case, as will be seen below), the outcome would be to finish this discussion much

nearer to the position I first advocated than to the one I opposed. Specifically, Cervin concludes the following:

(a) The meaning "source" is not "common" (as most egalitarians assert today). Rather, Cervin concludes that it is "quite rare" (p. 112) and he comes up with only one certain example where he thinks κεφαλή clearly means "source" (Herodotus 4.91, a fifth century BC text on the sources of a river, which was analyzed extensively in my earlier article).

(b) Cervin says that "head" does not mean either "authority" or "source" in Paul's Epistles, but rather means "preeminent." Cervin writes, "What then does Paul mean by his use of *head* in his letters? He does not mean 'authority over,' as the traditionalists assert, nor does he mean 'source' as the egalitarians assert. I think he is merely employing a head-body metaphor, and that his point is *preeminence*" (p. 112). Cervin goes on to explain how this would apply to the passages on husband and wife in the NT: "How can the husband be *preeminent* over his wife? In the context of the male-dominant culture of which Paul was a part, such a usage would not be inappropriate" (p. 112). So it seems to me that even if all of Cervin's criticisms of my article were valid, his article would still have to be seen as a rejection of the egalitarian claim that κεφαλή means "source" in the NT, and an affirmation of an understanding of the NT teaching on male headship that is congenial with (though not identical to) the one that I previously argued for. If his final explanation of the meaning "preeminent" with reference to "the *male-dominant* culture of which Paul was a part"³ were correct, his article would have to be seen as a modification of my position, not a rejection of it.

However, my response to Mr. Cervin must go deeper than that, because I do not think that he has (1) used proper methodology, (2) correctly evaluated the evidence, (3) represented my own article with complete fairness, or (4) come to correct conclusions.

A. THE REJECTION OF DATA CLOSEST TO THE NT WRITINGS

1. Rejection of NT Examples

One of the most surprising aspects of Mr. Cervin's article is that he dismisses all the NT examples of κεφαλή without examining one of them. Yet he concludes his article by telling us what Paul did and did not mean by κεφαλή (p. 112).

With regard to the twelve NT passages in which I claimed that the context indicated that the meaning "authority over" was appropriate for κεφαλή, Cervin says,

First of all, 12 of these passages (nos. 38-49) are from the NT, and are therefore illegitimate as evidence, since they are disputed texts. In

³Italics mine.

citing these NT passages, Grudem commits the logical fallacy of assuming what he sets out to prove. The whole purpose of Grudem's study is to determine whether or not *κεφαλή* can denote "authority over" or "leader" in Paul's epistles. He cannot therefore cite Paul as supporting evidence. (p. 94)

But Cervin here fails to distinguish "assuming what one sets out to prove" from *arguing for a meaning from context*, which is what I did in my article in each case (pp. 56-58).⁴ If Cervin disagrees with my arguments from the context of these NT examples, then it would be appropriate to give reasons why he disagrees. But it is hardly legitimate linguistic analysis to dismiss them out of hand.

This is especially significant when we realize that a number of the NT examples of *head* have nothing to do with husband-wife relationships in marriage but speak of Christ's universal rule. For example, "he has put all things under his feet and had made him the *head* over all things for the church" (Eph 1:22). Here *head* is clearly a metaphor, and it occurs in a context dealing with Christ's authority "over all things" and the fact that God the Father "has put all things under his feet." It is hard to avoid the sense of "authority over" or "ruler" in this case, since the fact of Christ's universal authority is so clearly mentioned in the very sentence in which the word occurs.⁵ Similarly, Col 2:10 says that Christ is "the *head* of all rule and authority" — clearly implying that Christ is the greater leader or authority over all other authorities in the universe. Moreover, in a context in which Paul says that "the church is subject to Christ," he says that "Christ is the *head* of the church" (Eph 5:23-24). Once again the idea of Christ's authority over the church seems so relevant to Paul's statements in the immediate context that it is surprising that Cervin thinks such texts can be dismissed without any discussion at all.

Other NT texts could be mentioned, but it should at least be clear that it is highly unusual to conclude an article with a statement about what Paul could have meant by the word *κεφαλή* when one has not examined Paul's own uses of *κεφαλή* at any point in the article. I do not recall ever before reading an article that concluded with a pronouncement about what a certain author meant by the use of a word, but did not examine *any* of the uses of the word by that

⁴In this article I am citing the page references from my earlier *TrinJ* article rather than from the article as it appeared as an appendix to George Knight's book (see footnote 1).

⁵Later in this article I discuss the claim of some recent interpreters that *κεφαλή* does not mean "authority over" in this and other passages dealing with Christ's rule. To my knowledge, no commentary and no lexicon in the history of the church has denied the meaning "ruler" or "authority over" in this passage until 1981, when Berkeley and Alvera Mickelsen suggested the meaning "top or crown" in their article, "The 'Head' of the Epistles" (*Christianity Today*, 20 February, 1981, 22). But they give no argument for this interpretation except to assert it. And they admit that the context is discussing "Christ's authority over everything in creation" (*ibid.*).

author himself. Would Cervin do this for Plato or for Aristotle? If the meaning of a certain term as used by Aristotle was “under dispute” because some author had recently challenged the traditional understanding of Aristotle’s use of that word, I imagine that Mr. Cervin would use the following procedure:

- (1) He would first look carefully at the uses of that term in Aristotle and try to decide from the context what meaning the word had in each case.
- (2) Next he would look at the uses of that word in literature *closest* to Aristotle in time (what linguists call “synchronic analysis” of a term).
- (3) Then he would look at uses further away in time, subject matter, and culture — writers who shared less of a common linguistic stock with Aristotle because of the possible changes in language over time. (“Diachronic analysis” refers to such tracing of the different uses of a word over time.)

Such a procedure would be characteristic of sound linguistic analysis.

But this is just the opposite of what Cervin does, for he dismisses the NT texts without examining even one verse. Then by other means he dismisses examples from other literature closest to the NT.

2. Rejection of Septuagint Examples

The Septuagint (LXX) was the everyday Bible used most commonly by the NT authors and by Greek-speaking Christians throughout the NT world. Yet Cervin dismisses the value of its evidence because it is a translation: “As a translation, the LXX is valuable as a *secondary* source, not as a *primary* one” (pp. 95-96).⁶ At the end of the article he says,

Of the four clear examples, three are from the LXX and one is from the Shepherd of Hermas, and it is very likely that all four of these are imported, not native, metaphors. . . . Does κεφαλή denote “authority over” or “leader”? No. The only clear and unambiguous examples of such a meaning stem from the Septuagint and The Shepherd of Hermas, and the metaphor may well have been influenced from Hebrew in the Septuagint. The metaphor ‘leader’ for *head* is alien to the Greek language until the Byzantine or Medieval period. (pp. 111-12)

But if the Septuagint was indeed the Bible used by the NT authors and Christians throughout the NT world (as it was), then the

⁶Cervin also briefly mentions the argument that κεφαλή in the LXX only seldom translates Hebrew **רִאשׁוֹן** when referring to leaders. Because this argument is developed more fully by the Mickelsens, I treat it below (pp. 42-47).

fact that it was a translation made two centuries earlier does not mean that its examples of the use of κεφαλή are irrelevant as evidence. To dismiss these as irrelevant would be similar to someone trying to find out what American evangelical Christians in 1990 meant by the use of a word, and then saying that the use of that word in the NASB or NIV Bibles could not count as evidence because those Bibles were "translations" and therefore may not reflect native English uses of the word.

In fact, quite the opposite is the case: though the Septuagint is not perfect as a translation, it was certainly adequate to be used throughout the Greek-speaking world for several hundred years. To some extent it reflected the use of Greek common at the time it was translated, and to some extent (as all widely-accepted Bible translations do) it influenced the language of the people who used it. Because of both of these facts, the usage of a word in the Septuagint is *extremely important* for determining the meaning of a word in the NT. The standard Greek lexicon for the NT and other early Christian literature (by Bauer, Arndt, Gingrich, and Danker) quotes the Septuagint more frequently than any other corpus of literature outside the NT for that very reason. In fact, in Walter Bauer's "Introduction" to this lexicon he says, "As for the influence of the LXX, every page of this lexicon shows that it outweighs all other influences on our literature."⁷ Sound linguistic analysis would recognize this and would pay closest attention to the literature *most closely related* to the corpus of literature in question. But Cervin fails to admit such evidence as relevant, and this must be counted as a major methodological flaw in his argument.

3. Rejection of the Apostolic Fathers

The other corpus of literature most closely related to the NT is commonly referred to as "the Apostolic Fathers" (the name originally was intended to signify authors who knew the apostles personally). These writings are also extremely valuable for understanding NT usage, because the proximity in time, culture, and subject matter means that these writers shared a linguistic stock that was almost exactly the same as that of the NT writers. Yet again with regard to a citation from the Shepherd of Hermas (*Similitudes* 7:3, where a husband is referred to as "the head of your household"), Cervin admits that the sense "leader" attaches to the word *head*, but he rejects this as valid evidence for the use of a word in the NT because he says that the author was unknown: "We do not know who wrote the Shepherd. . . . If the author were a foreigner, it is entirely possible that this metaphor could have been calqued from his own native language. If this were the case, then

⁷BAGD, xxi.

this would be another example of an imported, not a native metaphor" (p. 105).

But this is hardly a sufficient basis on which to reject the evidence of this quotation. The Shepherd of Hermas was so widely known in the early Christian world that for at least two hundred years many thought that it should be included as part of the NT canon (in 325 Eusebius still classified it among the "disputed books"; see *HE* 3.3.6).

4. Rejection of examples from Plutarch

Plutarch (ca. AD 50 - ca. 120) was a secular Greek historian and philosopher. Because he lived so close to the time of the NT his writings are another useful source for understanding the meanings of Greek words around the time of the NT. But Cervin rejects three examples of κεφαλή meaning "authority over" in Plutarch because he says they may have been a translation from Latin.

Regarding two examples in Plutarch, *Cicero* 14.4, where *head* is used as a metaphor for the Roman emperor, Cervin admits that they refer to a "leader," but objects that the examples are illegitimate primarily because "Cataline was speaking in Latin, not Greek . . . and it is equally possible that Plutarch translated the Latin rather literally for the sake of the 'riddle.' If this were so, then this use of *head* for 'leader' is really a Latin metaphor, and not a Greek one. . . . These examples are therefore illegitimate." (p. 102)⁸

Then regarding Plutarch, *Galba* 4.3, he says, "Galba was a Roman, not a Greek, and this passage, like the preceding, may have been influenced by Latin. Ziegler provides no known source material for this passage in Plutarch. This example is therefore dubious." (p. 103)

But in response we must remember that Plutarch wrote not in Latin but in Greek, and that Plutarch certainly thought himself to be writing Greek that was understandable to his readers. Whether or not the text was based on some Latin source material does not provide legitimate grounds for rejecting these examples.

5. Rejection of Patristic Evidence

Cervin then rejects any instances of *head* meaning "authority" from the period immediately after that of the Apostolic Fathers, the period of the Patristic writings. He admits that in Lampe's *Patristic Greek Lexicon* there are many citations referring to Christ as the "head of the church," and a few citations where κεφαλή refers to "religious superiors or bishops" (p. 107). These references would seem to be strong evidence that κεφαλή could mean "authority over" or "leader." But Cervin dismisses these examples

⁸See below, pp. 32-34, for more detailed discussion of Cervin's objection to this passage in Plutarch.

with the following sentence: "It appears that the use of *head* in Patristic Greek is a technical term referring primarily to Christ, and occasionally to members of the ecclesiastical order" (p. 107).

But what kind of linguistic analysis is Cervin doing here? If the examples of *κεφαλή* meaning "authority over" are few, he calls them "rare." If the examples are many (as in the Patristic literature), he says it is a "technical term." One wonders what kind of evidence would satisfy him so that *κεφαλή* does mean "authority over"? He concludes, "Grudem's citation of Lampe is misleading" (p. 107), but by what kind of logic do examples that support a case become "misleading"? It is not clear to me how he can reason that instances of *κεφαλή* where it refers to Christ or to church officers in authority over the church do not show that *κεφαλή* can mean "leader" or "authority over."

6. Rejection of NT Lexicons

In addition to dismissing without examination, or explaining away, the instances of *κεφαλή* meaning "authority over" from the NT, the Septuagint, the Apostolic Fathers, Plutarch, and the Patristic writers, Cervin also dismisses evidence from all the lexicons that specialize in the NT period and impugns the competence of their authors. Cervin asks,

. . . [I]f "leader" is a *common* understanding of *κεφαλή*, as Grudem claims, then why is it apparently never so listed in *any* Greek lexicon outside the purview of the NT? I offer several possible reasons, not the least of which is *tradition* and a *male-dominant world view*. (p. 87)

As Cervin continues his explanation, he for some reason repeatedly refers to those who write lexicons specializing in the NT period as "theologians":

The expertise of *theologians*⁹ is the NT, not Classical, or even Hellenistic Greek, per se. While it may be true that some *theologians* have had a grounding in Classical Greek (especially those of the 19th century), they spend their time pondering the NT, *not* Plato, Herodotus, or Plutarch. . . . Another reason stems from Latin. . . . [T]he Latin word for "head," *caput*, does have the metaphorical meaning of "leader." . . . Thus, for English-speaking *theologians*, at least, English, Hebrew, and Latin all share "leader" as a common metaphor for *head*. Thus, the forces of tradition, a male-dominant culture, the identical metaphor in three languages, and a less than familiar un-

⁹In this quotation the emphasis on the word "theologians" is mine. Cervin seems determined to show that those who specialize in the interpretation of the NT do not have competence in understanding the meanings of terms. But why should the fact that one specializes in the study of NT literature automatically mean that one is incompetent in lexicography or linguistics or classical Greek? Especially in the case of Bauer's *Lexicon* this is certainly a false assumption. To continue to call such scholars

derstanding of the Greek language *as a whole*, could, in my mind, very easily lead *theologians* to assume that the metaphor of "leader" for *head* must be appropriate for Greek as well. (p. 87)

The result of this analysis is that Cervin rejects the judgment of the editors of those lexicons that specialize in the very period of the Greek language for which his article intends to give us a meaning for κεφαλή.

But several objections must be raised against Cervin's evaluation of the value of these lexicons.

(a) The assertion that the authors of NT lexicons do not read "Plato, Herodotus, or Plutarch" simply indicates a lack of familiarity with the Bauer-Arndt-Gingrich-Danker lexicon, whose pages are peppered with thousands of references to extra-biblical authors, frequently including Plato, Herodotus, and Plutarch, as well as many, many others. The primary author of this lexicon, Professor Walter Bauer of Göttingen University, worked for more than thirty years at this task (see BAGD, pp. v-vi), during which time he "undertook a systematic search in Greek literature" for "parallels to the language of the NT" (*ibid.*). Moises Silva says,

Bauer was fully sensitive to the need *not* to isolate the NT language from the contemporary speech and thus his work abounds with thousands of invaluable references to secular literature where parallel constructions occur — these references alone make Bauer's *Lexicon* a veritable treasure.¹⁰

While Cervin cites with approval many specialized lexicons for authors such as Xenophon, Plato, Sophocles, etc. (pp. 86-87), he makes the serious mistake of rejecting the value of Bauer's lexicon. By contrast, Moises Silva says of Bauer's lexicon, "It may be stated categorically that this is the best specialized dictionary available for any ancient literature."¹¹

(b) One may wonder if Cervin would follow a similar procedure when attempting to determine the meaning of a Greek word in some other specialized corpus of literature. Would he reject the use of a specialized lexicon for Aristotle, for example, when attempting to determine the meaning of a word in Aristotle, simply because the authors of the lexicon spent most of their time looking at Aristotle's words? And would he call the authors of an Aristotle lexicon "philosophers" (rather than "linguists") because the subject matter about which Aristotle wrote was philosophy? Similarly, would he insist on calling the linguists who wrote a specialty lexicon for Herodotus "historians" (rather than "linguists") because Herodotus wrote

"theologians" when their specialty is lexicography is both inaccurate and misleading to readers.

¹⁰Moises Silva, *Biblical Words and Their Meaning: An Introduction to Lexical Semantics* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1983) 172.

¹¹*Ibid.* 171.

about history? The editors of NT Greek lexicons (such as BAGD) should not be dismissed so easily.

(c) It is not immediately apparent why "tradition and a male-dominant world view" would have any effect on a scholar trying to determine what the NT means when it says that God made Christ "the *head* over all things for the church" (Eph 1:22) or that Christ is the "*head* of all rule and authority" (Col 2:10). Rather than a male-dominant world view, the only thing required for someone to see "authority over" in these passages would be an ability to recognize that the first century authors had a "*Christ-dominant*" world view, and expressed that in their writings.

(d) The fact that *head* can mean "leader" in English, Hebrew, and Latin should not influence a competent team of editors to see that meaning in Greek unless the context required it in various places. The argument must simply be decided on the basis of the actual Greek texts in which such a meaning is claimed to be found — but Cervin does not provide us with any such analysis for the important NT texts.

7. *Acceptance of Specialized Lexicons Distant from the NT Period*

It is surprising to find that Cervin gives extensive weight to lexicons specializing in authors far distant from the NT period. Thus, he gives a long list of lexicons which he examined and in which he did not find the meaning "authority over, leader" for κεφαλή. What he does not tell the reader, and what certainly would not be evident to the non-technically trained reader of *Trinity Journal* who sees this long list of titles of Greek lexicons (many with Latin titles), is the *dates* of the authors for whom these specialty lexicons give definitions. But the authors covered by the lexicons (with dates) are as follows (following the order in Cervin's list, pp. 86-87):

Xenophon	4th century BC
Plato	5th/4th century BC
Thucydides	5th century BC
Sophocles	5th century BC
Aeschylus	5th century BC
Theocritus	3rd century BC
Homer	8th century BC
Herodotus	5th century BC
Polybius	2nd century BC
Plotinus	3rd century A.D.
Diodorus Siculus	1st century BC

What is proved by such a survey? The impression given the reader is that Cervin has found new evidence, but he has not. Rather he has just shown my earlier study to be affirmed by these additional lexicons. I searched several of those authors exhaustively for the

term κεφαλή in my earlier study, and (with the exception of one citation in Herodotus and one in Plato), I did not find the meaning “authority over” in any of those authors either. But most of them (with the exception of Polybius and Diodorus Siculus) are quite distant from the time of the NT — far more distant than the instances in the NT, the Septuagint, and the Apostolic Fathers, which Cervin dismisses.

But a further question arises. Why is a lexicon on Plato or Thucydides given more credence than a specialty lexicon in the NT period? In his selection of evidence from lexicons, as well as in his admission of examples of κεφαλή as relevant evidence, Cervin places evidence that is *most distant* chronologically on a much higher level than evidence which is chronologically *nearest* to the writings of Paul. He thus fails to carry out the careful synchronic analysis necessary to good lexical research.

8. Conclusion: A Flawed Methodology Producing an Erroneous Conclusion

What is the outcome of this procedure? Cervin by one means or another places all the examples where κεφαλή means “authority over” in special categories: the NT texts are “under dispute.” The Septuagint is a “translation.” The Shepherd of Hermas may have been written by a “foreigner.” The patristic writings use κεφαλή as a “technical term.” The citations from Plutarch “may have been influenced by Latin.” And the NT lexicons were influenced by “tradition and a male-dominant world view” as well as “a less-than-familiar understanding of the Greek language *as a whole*.” Thus, by eliminating all the examples where κεφαλή means “authority over” in the NT period, Cervin is enabled to conclude that κεφαλή did not mean “authority over” “until the Byzantine or Medieval period” (p. 112). Yet we must keep in mind that he can do this only by the incorrect linguistic method of deciding that all the relevant texts from the second century BC to several centuries after the NT do not count as evidence. It seems fair to conclude that Cervin’s article is fundamentally flawed at the outset in its methodology, a methodology that wrongly excludes the most relevant data for this investigation, and thereby leads him to an erroneous conclusion. On this basis alone, we must reject Cervin’s claim that κεφαλή did not mean “authority over” at the time of the NT.

We can now examine Cervin’s analysis of specific texts in more detail.

B. THE CLAIM THAT Κεφαλή MAY MEAN "SOURCE" IN SOME TEXTS

1. Herodotus 4.91.

Cervin does not claim that the meaning "source" is common for κεφαλή, but he thinks that it occurs at least once where it clearly takes that sense:

Can κεφαλή denote "source"? The answer is *yes*, in Herodotus 4.91; *perhaps*, in the Orphic Fragment and elsewhere (in Artemidorus Daldianus, *T. Reuben* [no. 17], and in Philo [nos. 21-22]). Is the meaning "source" common? Hardly! It is quite rare. (p. 112)

But are Cervin's arguments convincing concerning the one clear example of the meaning "source" which he finds in Herodotus 4.91? Cervin says that "Grudem . . . has failed to comprehend Herodotus" (p. 89), and then he goes on to quote the Herodotus passage at length, showing that "in context, it is clear that Herodotus is discussing the 'source' (πηγαί) of the Tearus River. . . . The context of this passage should make it abundantly clear that Herodotus is using κεφαλαί as a synonym of πηγαί, referring to the source of the Tearus" (p. 90).

But it is unclear from this how Cervin has said anything different from what I said in my first article when I said that "someone speaking of the 'heads' of a river is speaking of the many 'ends' of a river where tributaries begin to flow toward the main stream" (p. 44), and when I cited the Liddell-Scott reference to κεφαλή as "the source of a river," but pointed out that they only said that it had that meaning "in the plural." I agree completely that κεφαλαί (plural) in this statement by Herodotus does refer to the sources of the Tearus River. But Cervin has said nothing in answer to my analysis of this statement, where I suggest that the quotation uses "head" in a commonly accepted sense, namely, "beginning point, furthest extremity, end point," and that the quotation does not show that κεφαλή could *mean* "source" in any general sense. In fact, the only "sources" that are designated by the term κεφαλή are those which are also at the geographical or physical "end point" of something. This explains why the "mouth" of a river (the other *end point*) can equally well be called the *head* (κεφαλή) of a river. This fact would not make sense at all if κεφαλή meant "source" generally, but it does make sense if κεφαλή means "end point" generally. Cervin has failed to address this understanding of κεφαλή as an alternative explanation to the general sense "source."

Moreover, it should be noted that the Liddell-Scott lexicon itself agrees with my analysis of the Herodotus quotation. The over-

all structure of the κεφαλή article in Liddell-Scott is as follows (I have reproduced the outline structure exactly as it is in LSJ):

- I.
 1. Head of Man or Beast
 - a. Down over the head
 - b. On the head
 - c. From head to foot
 - d. Head foremost
 2. As the noblest part, periphrastically for the whole person
 3. Life
 4. In imprecations, on my head be it!
- II.
 1. Of things, extremity
 - a. In Botany
 - b. In Anatomy
 - c. Generally, *top*, *brim* of a vessel . . . *coping* of a wall . . . *capital* of a column
 - d. In plural, *source* of a river, Herodotus 4.91 (but singular, *mouth*); generally, *source*, *origin*, *Orphic Fragments* 21a; starting point [examples: the head of time; the head of a month]
 - e. *Extremity* of a plot of land
- III. *Bust* of Homer
- IV. Wig, head dress
- V. Metaphorically
 1. The *pièce de résistance*
 2. Crown, completion
 3. *Sum*, *total*
 4. *Band* of men
 5. Astronomy, "head of the world"

This outline indicates that the definition "source" (II.d.) was never intended by Liddell-Scott to be taken as a general definition applied to all sorts of "sources." They were simply indicating that the general category "Of things, extremity" was illustrated by the fact that both the beginning point and end point (the source and the mouth) of a river could be referred to with the term κεφαλή.¹²

¹²Peter Cotterell and Max Turner (*Linguistics and Biblical Interpretation* [Downers Grove: IVP, 1989] 142) comment on Herodotus 4.91:

However, the singular word is also used of the *mouth* of the river . . . and the easiest explanation of both of these usages of κεφαλή is that they derive from the lexeme's established sense of "extreme end." . . . We do not need to posit that they represent *new senses*, "source" and "mouth" respectively, for which we have no corroborating evidence . . . (142).

Neither Cervin nor Liddell-Scott give any citations where κεφαλή is applied to a person and clearly means "source."

2. Orphic Fragments 21a

This text by an unknown author from the fifth century BC or earlier was analyzed at some length in my earlier article (see pp. 45-46). The text reads, "Zeus the head, Zeus the middle, Zeus from whom all things are perfected."

Cervin concludes that several different meanings are possible here and no clear decision can be made:

Grudem's understanding of "beginning" for this fragment is quite valid. However, the understanding of "source" is also quite valid. . . . Zeus as the "head/beginning/source/origin/cause" are all plausible readings. This fragment contains a series of epithets of Zeus. Otherwise, there is really no context which can be appealed to in order to settle which meaning(s) were intended by the author. (p. 91)

At this point I concur with Cervin's analysis and simply note that the ambiguity of the text makes it illegitimate to use as a clear example of κεφαλή meaning "source."

3. Other Possible Examples of the Meaning "Source"

Cervin briefly analyzes a few other texts that have been cited by Philip Payne¹³ as examples of the meaning "source." These texts are Philo, *Preliminary Studies* 61; Philo, *On Rewards and Punishments* 125; and six instances in Artemidorus Daldianus, *Onirocriticon* (Cervin, pp. 92-94). But Cervin does not see any of these as certain examples of the meaning "source," for he simply concludes that κεφαλή "perhaps" has this sense in some of those passages (he is doubtful about a number of the passages Payne cites).¹⁴ I will discuss these passages more fully below in the section on Philip Payne's article.¹⁵

¹³Philip Payne, "Response," in *Women, Authority, and the Bible*, ed. Alvera Mickelsen (Downers Grove: IVP, 1986) 118-36.

¹⁴He says that one example is not a metaphor at all but a simile and "has nothing to do with 'source' or 'authority.'" Regarding a number of other passages in Artemidorus he says, "Several of the passages cited by Payne do not warrant the interpretation of 'source', however" (92).

¹⁵Some (though not Cervin) have also suggested (in personal correspondence to me, without attribution) that an example of κεφαλή meaning "source" may be found in *The Life of Adam and Eve* 19.3, which calls sinful desire (Greek ἐπιθυμία) "the head of every sin." But once again this text is ambiguous: "Head" here could well mean just "beginning" or "starting point, first in a series." Moreover, the example is hardly reliable for NT evidence, since it is only found in two 13th century AD Italian manuscripts, designated A and B by R. H. Charles (*The Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament* [2 vols.; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1913] 1:146; compare discussion of manuscripts on pp. 124-25). Charles himself does not think the reading κεφαλή to be correct here and follows manuscript C in its reading βίζα καὶ ἀρχή.

C. THE CLAIM THAT Κεφαλή DOES NOT MEAN "AUTHORITY OVER"

After analyzing the forty-nine texts which I had categorized with the meaning, "Person of superior authority or rank, or 'ruler,' 'ruling part,'" (pp. 51-58), Mr. Cervin summarizes his conclusions as follows:

Of Grudem's 49 examples, the 12 of the NT are illegitimate as evidence on the grounds that one cannot logically assume what one intends to prove. This leaves 37 examples, only four of which are clear and unambiguous examples of κεφαλή meaning "leader" (examples 8, 10, 14, 30). Eleven examples are dubious, questionable, or ambiguous (4, 5, 6, 7, 11, 12, 13, 23, 26, 36, 37); twelve examples are false (1, 3, 9, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 28, 29); seven other examples are illegitimate (24, 25, 27, 31, 32, 33, 34); two examples do not exist (2 and 16); and one example (35) cannot be decided. Of the four clear examples, three are from the LXX and one is from the Shepherd of Hermas, and it is very likely that all four of these are imported, not native, metaphors. (p. 111)

In what follows I shall look again at the texts involved and ask whether Cervin's evaluation of these texts is convincing.

1. Twelve NT Examples that Cervin Considers Illegitimate

First, he says that the twelve NT examples "are illegitimate as evidence on the grounds that one cannot logically assume what one intends to prove" (p. 111). But as it was noted above, Cervin commits a major linguistic error when he fails to examine these uses in context, for they are the examples closest in use of language to the texts in question. To argue for the meaning "authority over" from the context of these texts (as I did in my previous article, on pp. 56-58) is not to "assume" what one intends to prove, but it is to *argue* for it by *giving reasons and evidence*. In the course of the discussion between Mr. Cervin and me, one wonders if the person who has "assumed what he intends to prove" might not rather be the one who dismissed twelve NT examples without examining them at all, rather than the one who examined each of them in context and gave reasons why the meaning "authority over" seemed appropriate.

Without repeating the earlier arguments from my first article, I will simply list those twelve examples here with their original

therefore translating this different phrase "root and beginning" (p. 146). James H. Charlesworth (*The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha* [2 vols; Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1983-85] 2:279) translates "origin," but notes that κεφαλή here corresponds to Hebrew ראש, meaning "head" or "first" (279, note e). (The Greek text is found in C. von Tischendorf, *Apocalypses Apocryphae* [Leipzig, 1866] 11).

enumeration. (Some of these texts are discussed later in this article, in response to the suggestions by other scholars that the meaning "source" might be appropriate in some cases.)

(38-42) 1 Cor 11:3: "I want you to know that the *head* of every man is Christ, and the *head* of the woman is the man, and the *head* of Christ is God. Any man who prays or prophesies with his head covered dishonors his head, but any woman who prays or prophesies with her head unveiled dishonors her head."

(43) Eph 1:22: "He has put all things under his feet and has made him the *head* over all things for the church."

(44) Eph 4:15: "We are to grow up in every way into him who is the *head*, into Christ, from whom the whole body, joined and knit together by every joint with which it is supplied, when each part is working properly, makes bodily growth and upbuilds itself in love."¹⁶

(45-46) Eph 5:22-24: "Wives, be subject to your husbands, as to the Lord. For the husband is the *head* of the wife as Christ is the *head* of the church, his body, and is himself its Savior. As the church is subject to Christ, so let wives also be subject in everything to their husbands."

(47) Col 1:18: "He is the *head* of the body, the church."

(48) Col 2:10: "And you have come to fullness of life in him, who is the *head* of all rule and authority."

(49) Col 2:18-19: "Let no one disqualify you, insisting on self-abasement and worship of angels, taking his stand on visions, puffed up without reason by his sensuous mind, and not holding fast to the *Head*, from whom the whole body, nourished and knit together through its joints and ligaments, grows with a growth that is from God."

Although the sense "authority over, leader" is clear in most of these texts, it is appropriate at this point to discuss Eph 4:15 and Col 2:19. Some writers (though not Cervin, since he does not examine NT verses) have said that the meaning "source" fits well in Eph 4:15 (since "bodily growth" is said to come from the "head") and in Col 2:19 (since the body is said to be "nourished" and "joined together" from the head, and thereby to receive growth from the head).

Certainly it is correct to note that the idea of nourishment and therefore growth coming from the head is present in these verses. The reason for such a description is not hard to discover: it is an evident fact of nature that we take in food through the mouth and therefore nourishment for the body comes "from" the head. So when Paul has already called Christ the "head" of the body, which is the church, it would be natural for him to say that we must hold fast to him and that our nourishment and growth comes from him.

¹⁶ See discussion below on the possible meaning "source" here.

But do these verses show that κεφαλή could mean “source”? Not exactly, because in these cases the *function* of the head being the source of nourishment is simply more prominent. The metaphorical meaning “source” has not attached to the word κεφαλή sufficiently that this sense would be clear from the use of the word alone apart from the presence of this larger metaphor. That is, we could not substitute “source” in these verses and make any sense, for Col 2:19 would say, “Not holding fast to the *source*, from whom the whole body, nourished and knit together . . .” and Eph 4:15 would speak of “the *source* . . . from whom the whole body . . . makes bodily growth.” But these are unintelligible statements. We need the actual meaning “head” in these verses or else the whole metaphor does not make sense. (This is not the case in several verses where “ruler” or “authority over” will substitute well and the sentence still make sense, as Eph 1:22, “Has made him the *ruler* over all things for the church,” or 1 Cor. 11:3, “the *authority over* every man is Christ,” or Col 2:10, “who is the *ruler* over all rule and authority”.)

The fact that at times in using a head/body metaphor the NT calls attention to the idea of nourishment coming from the head to the body is clear in Eph 4:15 and Col 2:19. But it is not sufficient to show that the word κεφαλή itself means “source.” (This is similar to the vine and branches analogy that Jesus uses in John 15:1-8: if we “abide” in the vine, we bring forth much fruit. But that does not mean that the word “vine” means “source of life.”)

Moreover, even in these contexts the nuance of “leader” or “authority” is never absent, for the person called “head” (here, Christ) is always the person in leadership over the others in view. In addition, we must recognize the close parallels in content and circumstances of writing in Ephesians and Colossians, and realize that five of Paul’s seven metaphorical uses of κεφαλή in Ephesians and Colossians have clear connotations of “authority” or “ruler” (Eph 1:22; 5:22-24 [twice]; Col 1:18; 2:10, all cited above), and that these are in contexts quite near to Eph 4:15 and Col 2:19. When all of these considerations are combined, it seems very unlikely that these two references to Christ as “head” of the body would carry no connotations of authority or rulership over that body. In fact, it is probable that Christ’s rule over the church is the primary reason why the “head” metaphor is applied to his relationship to the church at all, and this other connotation (that the head is the place from which food comes to nourish the body) was brought in by Paul as a secondary idea to it.

What shall we conclude about these examples? In the absence of specific objections from Cervin showing why the meaning “authority over” is inappropriate, it seems fair at this point in our discussion still to accept these as legitimate examples where such a sense is at least appropriate — and in several cases it seems to be required.

2. Four Examples that Cervin Considers Clear and Unambiguous

Cervin says there are four examples which are “clear and unambiguous examples of κεφαλή meaning ‘leader’” (p. 111). These are the following examples:

(8) 2 Kgdms (2 Sam) 22:44: David says to God, “You shall keep me as the *head* of the Gentiles: a people which I knew not served me.”

(10) Ps 17(18):43: David says to God, “You will make me *head* of the Gentiles: a people whom I knew not served me.”

(14) Isa 7:9: “The *head* of Samaria is the son of Remaliah.”

(30) Hermas, *Similitudes* 7.3: The man is told that his family “cannot be punished in any other way than if you, the *head* of the house, be afflicted.”

But if Cervin admits these four examples to be “clear and unambiguous” on p. 111, how can he conclude the following: “Does κεφαλή denote ‘authority over’ or ‘leader’? No” (p. 112). This is an unusual kind of reasoning — to say that there are four “clear and unambiguous examples of κεφαλή meaning ‘leader’” (p. 111), and then to say that κεφαλή does not denote “authority over” or “leader” at this period in the history of the Greek language (p. 112).

If we look for the basis on which Cervin has rejected the validity of the four “clear and unambiguous” examples, the only explanation given is his statement that “it is very likely that all four of these are imported, not native, metaphors” (p. 111). He also says that in these cases “the metaphor may very well have been influenced from Hebrew in the Septuagint” (p. 112).

But here he has shifted the focus of the investigation and the criteria for evaluating examples without notifying the reader. Whereas the article as a whole purports to be an investigation of whether κεφαλή could mean “authority over” in the NT, here he has shifted to asking whether the metaphor is a “native” one in Greek or has been “imported” into Greek under the influence of other languages. That itself is an interesting question, but it is linguistically an inappropriate criterion to use for determining the meanings of NT words. In fact, NT Greek is strongly influenced by the language of the Septuagint, and the Septuagint is certainly influenced to some degree by the Hebrew OT. Moreover, the Greek language as a whole at the time of the NT had many words that had been influenced by other languages at that time (especially Latin), but words that were nonetheless ordinary, understandable Greek words in the vocabulary of everyday speakers. Cervin seems to be assuming that words can have no legitimate meanings that have come by the influence of other languages — certainly a false linguistic principle.

The question should rather be, "Was this an understandable meaning to ordinary readers at the time of the NT?" The clear NT examples cited above (which Cervin fails to examine), and the fact that these four other examples are from the literature *closest* to the NT in time and subject matter (see above), both give strong evidence that this was an understandable meaning for first-century readers. Cervin's introduction of the question of whether this is an "imported" metaphor (influenced by another language) or whether it is "native" (dating from the early history of the language) simply muddies the water here and skews his final conclusion.¹⁷

There is one further puzzling factor in Cervin's summary of his survey of instances of κεφαλή. Though in the summary he only mentions four "clear and unambiguous examples" of κεφαλή meaning "leader," this total does not include the examples from the article by Joseph Fitzmyer which Cervin discussed on pp. 108-11. In that discussion Cervin admitted the meaning "leader" in some other contexts:

In Jer 31:7 (LXX 38:7) we read, "Rejoice and shout over the *head* of the nations."

Cervin says about this statement, "Fitzmyer says that the 'notion of supremacy or authority is surely present' in this passage (p. 508). I do not necessarily disagree." (p. 108)

Fitzmyer also gives an example from Josephus, *War* 4.261, where Jerusalem is referred to as the "front and *head* of the whole nation." Cervin says, "The notion of 'leader' may be admitted here" (p. 111).

These citations apparently lead Cervin to admit that Paul could have used the word "head" in the sense of "leader" or "authority," for Cervin says,

Fitzmyer argues that, from his examples (and those of Grudem), "a Hellenistic Jewish writer such as Paul of Tarsus could well have intended that κεφαλή in 1 Cor 11:3 be understood as 'head' in the sense of authority or supremacy over someone else" (p. 510). This may be so (pp. 111-12)

But this statement seems to contradict directly his statement two paragraphs later where he says,

¹⁷We may of course ask the additional question, even if the metaphor of κεφαλή in the sense of "leader" was not a native Greek metaphor, would non-Jewish Greek speakers have understood it nonetheless? It seems quite likely that they would have understood it, because (1) the quotation from Plato, *Timaeus* 44d, noted below (example 3), shows that the idea of the head ruling over the body was commonly understood in Greek culture far before the time of the NT; (2) the quotations from Plutarch (my examples 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, noted below) are strong evidence of the use of κεφαλή meaning "leader" in a writer not influenced by the Hebrew Old Testament or the Septuagint; (3) the use of the adjective κεφάλαιος "head-like," in the phrase ὁ κεφάλαιος "the head-like one," to mean "leader" or "authority over" shows that a closely-related adjectival form of this word was used with that meaning in non-biblical Greek (see LSJ 944-45: "metaphorically, of persons, *the head or chief*").

Does κεφαλή denote "authority over" or "leader"? No. . . . The metaphor "leader" or *head* is alien to the Greek language until the Byzantine or medieval period." (p. 112)

Moreover, Cervin goes on to say, "What then does Paul mean by his use of *head* in his letters? He does not mean 'authority over,' as the traditionalists assert" (p. 112).

It is hard to understand how this analysis can be internally consistent. On the one hand Cervin admits that it "may be so" that Paul used the word κεφαλή in the sense of "authority or supremacy over someone else" (p. 112), and he cites several instances of literature close to Paul in which he admits the meaning "leader" or "authority over." On the other hand he says that κεφαλή does not take this meaning until the Byzantine period. Then he asserts (without examining any text in Paul) that Paul does not mean "authority over" when he uses the word κεφαλή. Such an argument gives at least the appearance of internal contradiction — and this may, in fact, be the case.

3. *Eleven Examples that Cervin Considers "Dubious, Questionable, or Ambiguous"*

In this category Cervin puts eleven examples which he thinks are unpersuasive because of various factors that make them "dubious, questionable, or ambiguous" (p. 111). Here he lists the following passages:¹⁸ (4) Judg 10:18; (5) Judg 11:8; (6) Judg 11:9; (7) Judg 11:11; (11) Isa 7:8a; (12) Isa 7:8b; (13) Isa 7:9a; (23) Plutarch 2.1.3; (26) Plutarch 4.3; (36) Libanius, *Oration* 20.3.15; (37) *Greek Anthology* 8.19.

Several of these examples Cervin dismisses because of the existence of a variant reading in the text. These are the following texts:

(4) Judg 10:18 (Alexandrinus): "And the people, the leaders of Gilead, said to one another 'Who is the man that will begin to fight against the Ammonites? He shall be *head* over all the inhabitants of Gilead.'"

(5) Judg 11:8 (Alexandrinus): "And the elders of Gilead said to Jephthah, 'That is why we have turned to you now, that you may go with us and fight with the Ammonites, and be our *head* over all the inhabitants of Gilead.'"

(6) Judg 11:9 (Alexandrinus): "Jephthah said to the elders of Gilead, 'If you bring me home again to fight with the Ammonites, and the Lord gives them over to me, I will be your *head*.'"

(12) Isa 7:8b (Sinaiticus omits): "The *head* of Damascus is Rezin" [Rezin is the king who rules over Damascus].

¹⁸Once again the numbering of the passages follows that of my original article.

Now the question is, Are these examples valid evidence for the use of κεφαλή to mean “leader”? Cervin calls the examples “dubious, due to the presence of the variant readings” (p. 96).

In response, the following points may be noted:

(1) These are not obscure variants. Three are from Alexandrinus, one of the three greatest ancient manuscripts of the Septuagint, and one is omitted only in Sinaiticus among the major manuscripts.

(2) The existence of a variant reading does make an example less weighty as evidence, but does not make the example entirely “dubious” as Cervin would have us believe, for the lexicons are full of examples of citations from texts where variant readings are found. The existence of these examples still indicates that *some* people in the ancient world (those who wrote and used these texts of the Septuagint, for example) thought that κεφαλή was a good word to mean “leader” metaphorically — and it was to show this fact that I cited these texts.

(3) If we were to rule out all texts with variant readings in discussions of the meaning of κεφαλή then we would have to exclude from discussion *Orphic Fragments* 21a (“Zeus the head . . .”), a text which those who claim the meaning “source” for κεφαλή cite with great frequency.¹⁹

(4) A better linguistic procedure than dismissing texts with variants (as Cervin would have us do) would simply be to do what I did in my original article: quote these texts as evidence *and* note the existence of a variant reading in each text. This would show what needs to be shown — that the examples are not as strong as if there were no variant, but that they are still valid examples and appropriate to use as additional evidence that some people in the ancient world thought that κεφαλή could be used metaphorically to mean “leader” or “authority.”²⁰

Next in this category of “dubious, questionable, or ambiguous” readings, Cervin puts the following two items:

(11) Isa 7:8a: “For the *head* of Syria is Damascus”

(13) Isa 7:9a: “And the *head* of Ephraim is Samaria”

Cervin rejects these examples because they “refer to capital cities, not to people” (p. 97). This fact is certainly true, as I pointed out in my original article (p. 55). And because of that fact we must

¹⁹I realize that this point does not apply to Cervin’s argument directly since he does not depend on *Orphic Fragments* 21a for his case, but I mention it here because of its relevance for the wider discussion.

²⁰One more question of a textual variant comes up when Cervin examines my example (9), 1 Kgs (LXX 3 Kgdms) 8:1 (Alexandrinus): “Then Solomon assembled all the elders of Israel and all the *heads* of the tribes.” Before commenting on the text itself, Cervin asserts, “The word κεφαλή does not even occur; rather it is found in a variation of Origen’s” (97). Cervin makes it sound as if I had quoted an example where the word does not occur in the Septuagint but rather was inserted by Origen (early third century AD). But in fact the word κεφαλή is found in the Alexandrinus text of the Septuagint (see H. B. Swete, *The Old Testament in Greek According to the Septuagint* [4th ed.; Cambridge: University Press, 190] 1:691; cf. Hatch-Redpath, 2:761).

recognize that these examples are not exactly parallel to the case where a *person* is called κεφαλή in the sense of "leader" or "ruler." Nonetheless, the idea of authority or rule is still prominent in such a reference to capital cities. Moreover, the connection between this "head" metaphor used of capital cities and its use to refer to persons is made quite explicit in a more full quotation of the context:

For the *head* of Syria is Damascus, and the *head* of Damascus is Rezin. . . . And the *head* of Ephraim is Samaria, and the *head* of Samaria is the son of Remaliah. (Isa 7:8-9)

In both cases the mention of a capital city is followed by the mention of the king who rules in that city, thus making the connection between the "head" city and the "head" of the government twice in two succeeding sentences. Far from being dubious these examples seem to be very strong and carry an unquestionable nuance of authority connected with the word κεφαλή.

Moreover, it is hard to understand what principle Cervin used to reject these examples where κεφαλή refers to a capital city and not to a person, but then to accept the meaning "source" for κεφαλή in Herodotus 4.91 (pp. 89-90). In that quotation κεφαλαί refers to the "sources" of a river, items which are *entirely* non-personal and have no connection to any context where the metaphor is applied to a person as a "source." If Cervin is to accept this Herodotus quotation (which he in fact claims as his single certain example of the meaning "source" [p. 112]), then consistency of methodology would seem to require that he accept much more readily the examples from Isa 7:8-9 which speak of capital cities as "heads" in close proximity to the mention of the reigning kings in those cities as "heads."

The next text which Cervin rejects in this category is

(7) Judg 11:11: "So Jephthah went with the elders of Gilead, and all the people made him *head* and leader over them."

Cervin says that the presence of the phrase "as a leader" or "as a ruler" in the Septuagint following the word "head" is "sufficient to clarify the metaphor" (p. 96). I certainly agree that this statement does "clarify the metaphor" and shows that the person designated "head" in this text was clearly the leader or ruler over the people. But then in the very next sentence Cervin simply asserts, "This example is also of questionable value" (p. 96). He gives no evidence or reason to support this statement, so there is really nothing to respond to except to say that this is a clear and unambiguous use of κεφαλή in the sense of "leader" or "authority over," and the mere assertion by Cervin that the example is of "questionable value" with no supporting argument to that effect does not make it of "questionable value."

The next example which Cervin rejects as ambiguous is

(23) Plutarch, *Pelopidas* 2.1.3: In an army, "The light-armed troops are like the hands, the cavalry like the feet, the line of

men-at-arms itself like chest and breastplate, and the general is like the *head*."

Here Cervin says that "Plutarch is using the human body as a simile for the army. This is obvious in context, which Grudem again fails to provide. . . . Plutarch does not call the general the 'head of the army'; he is merely employing a simile. This example is ambiguous at best, and may thus be dispensed with" (p. 101).²¹

In response, I think that Cervin is correct to point out that this is not a metaphorical use of "head" in which the general is called the "head of the army" but is instead a simile in which Plutarch says, "The general is like the head." It is indeed a helpful distinction to point out these similes and put them in a separate category, for, while they may be helpful in clarifying the use of a related metaphor, they are not precisely parallel. I would not agree that the example therefore may "be dispensed with," as Cervin says, for it is of some value in understanding the metaphor, but precision of analysis would be better served by putting it in a distinct category. I appreciate Mr. Cervin's suggestion at this point.

In the next quotation from Plutarch Cervin has a double criticism:

(26) Plutarch, *Galba* 4.3: "Vindex . . . wrote to Galba inviting him to assume the imperial power, and thus to serve what was a vigorous body in need of a *head*."

First Cervin says that "Plutarch is using the body as a simile. He is not calling Galba 'the head'" (p. 102). Yet the usage does seem more like a metaphor than a simile here, in spite of Cervin's assertion. Vindex does not say that Galba should "act like a head" to something that acts like a body, but should become "head" to a body that is seeking one. It is an extended metaphor but it is nonetheless a metaphor where the leader of a government is referred to as the "head" of a body.

Cervin's other criticism is to say that "Galba was a Roman, not a Greek, and that this passage, like the preceding, may have been influenced by Latin. Ziegler provides no known source material for this passage in Plutarch. This example is therefore dubious" (p. 103).

But this objection is simply dismissing the example on the basis of speculation without any supporting evidence. To say that a pas-

²¹It is puzzling to be told several times in Cervin's article that I failed to provide the context for a quotation. In this example (which is not unlike a number of others) I originally quoted three lines, and Mr. Cervin quotes five and says I failed to provide the context. (The quotation from Plutarch above is a *verbatim* quotation from my original article, for example.) It seems quite clear from my original quotation that Plutarch is using a simile, and it does not seem to me that I omitted anything essential for the reader. Of course in these cases there are always questions of judgment about what must necessarily be included in an article without entirely losing its readability, but I do not think I was unfair to the reader or that I withheld essential information about the context in any of the cases in which Cervin suggests that I did so (as in this case).

sage “may have been influenced by Latin” even though no one has found any Latin source material for the passage hardly constitutes a persuasive objection to its use and certainly does not provide adequate grounds for classifying it as “dubious.”

Moreover, we must remember that Plutarch is writing not in Latin but in Greek, and indeed in Greek that secular Greek-speaking people would find understandable. The example remains a valid one.

The last two examples that Cervin puts in this category are the following:

(36) Libanius, *Oration* 20.3.15 (4th century AD): People who derided government authorities are said to have “heaped on their own heads insults.”

(37) *Greek Anthology* 8.19 (Epigram of Gregory of Nazianus, 4th century AD): Gregory is called the “head of a wife and three children.”

Cervin points out that both of these quotations are quite late, being written about “300 years after Paul” (p. 106). I agree with Cervin on this point and think that it is best not to use these late quotations as evidence for the NT meaning of κεφαλή. I included them in my original survey for the sake of completeness because these authors were part of the *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae* project’s “Basic Text Package, Tape A,” which I obtained for the original search. But it would have been better to exclude them from my examination, since they are so late.

In conclusion to this section, of the eleven examples that Cervin says are “dubious, questionable, or ambiguous,” eight remain legitimate examples of κεφαλή meaning “authority over” or “leader,” one is a simile (the general of an army is like the head of a body) and gives supportive but not direct evidence, and two are too late to be used as valid evidence and must be rejected.

4. Twelve Examples that Cervin Considers False

Cervin considers twelve of my examples “false” examples of the use of κεφαλή to mean “authority over” or “ruler.” In my original article these were examples 1, 3, 9, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 28, and 29. I will examine these in order in the following discussion.

(1) Herodotus 7.148: The Delphic Oracle warns the Argives to defend their full citizens from attack and so protect the remainder of the population by “guarding your head from the blow; and the head shall shelter the body.”

Cervin says, “Head here is literal — as long as one’s head is safe, *i.e.*, as long as one’s brains are not splattered on the ground, one will continue to live. In hand-to-hand combat, each soldier protects *himself*, not his commanding officer!” (p. 95). Cervin therefore says this is a false example of κεφαλή to mean “leader.”

However, Cervin's explanation is doubtful, for the Delphic Oracle is not speaking in the plural ("guarding your heads from blows") to all the individual soldiers in the Argive army, but is speaking to the tribe of the Argives as a whole, telling them to guard their "head" from the blow. Nor is Cervin correct in saying that protecting one's head prevents death, for in combat a spear thrust through the body will also be fatal. So Cervin's explanation is not persuasive. Much more likely is the explanation given by the editor in a footnote to the Loeb Classical Library edition of Herodotus: *head* means "those with full citizenship, the nucleus of the population; σῶμα being the remainder" (p. 456, note 2).

The statement of the Delphic Oracle is of course couched in metaphor, but the metaphor seems clear enough to count this as a legitimate example. Nonetheless, since the idea of rule or authority is not explicitly there in the context (though full citizens do have governing authority), it would seem better to classify this as a "possible" example of κεφαλή meaning "authority over" or "leader" rather than a certain one. Yet we can hardly count it a "false" example.

The next example is from Plato, *Timaeus* 44D. Here I will quote in full the original statement used in my first article:

(3) Although Plato does not use the word κεφαλή explicitly to refer to a human ruler or leader, he does say (in the text quoted earlier), that "the head . . . is the most divine part and the one that reigns over all the parts within us" (*Timaeus* 44D). This sentence does speak of the head as the ruling part of the body and therefore indicates that a metaphor that spoke of the leader or ruler of a group of people as its "head" would not have been unintelligible to Plato or his hearers.

Cervin says, "There is no political, social, or military metaphor here; rather, Plato views the head as the preeminent part of the human body, 'the most divine part,' which controls the body's movements. Understanding this metaphor of Plato's will be significant for several examples to come" (p. 95).

It is hard to see why Cervin calls this a "false" example. Since it is explicitly a statement about the head as the ruling part of the body (the Greek text says that it rules, δεσποτέω, over all the parts within us), I classified it together in the general category, "person of superior authority or rank, or 'ruler,' 'ruling part'" (see category description on my p. 51). Several of my examples fit this last part of my original category, "ruling part." But I now realize that it would have been more precise to separate these examples into a distinct category in which the "ruling part" of the human body is both specifically said to rule the body and also called the "head," as in this example from Plato. (I specified this in my description of Plato's statement but did not count it in a separate category in my enumeration.)

Nonetheless, the example should not simply be dismissed as "false," for it does show clearly that a metaphor which spoke of a leader or ruler as a "head" would very likely have been understandable to native Greek speakers from a time several centuries before the apostle Paul wrote.

Four other examples from my original survey should also be included here because they show that the Jewish writer Philo and the Roman historian Plutarch also recognized the fact that the head was the ruling or governing center in the human body. These quotations are as follows:

(18) Philo, *On Dreams* 2.207: "'Head' we interpret allegorically to mean the ruling (ἡγεμόνα) part of the soul."

(20) Philo, *Moses* 2.82: "The mind is head and ruler (ἡγεμονικόν) of the sense-faculty in us."

(28-29) Plutarch, *Table Talk* 6.7 (692.E.1): "We affectionately call a person 'soul' or 'head' from his ruling parts." Here the metaphor of the head ruling the body is clear, as is the fact that the head controls the body in *Table Talk* 3.1 (647.C): "For pure wine, when it attacks the *head* and severs the body from the control of the mind, distresses a man."

My only objection to Cervin's comments on these passages (in addition to his general categorization of them as "false" examples) is at example 28, where Plutarch says, "We affectionately call a person 'soul' or 'head' from his *ruling parts* (Greek τῶν κυριωτάτων)." Cervin translates this, "From his *principal parts*," but surely the word κυριωτάτων (a superlative form of the adjective κύριος) is much more likely to take the sense "having power or authority over" (LSJ, 1013) here than the sense "important, principal" (ibid.), since Plutarch speaks elsewhere of a "head" in a ruling function (see my examples 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29). Moreover, the translation "principal parts" does not fit the context of the Plutarch quotation as well because Plutarch also gives this as an explanation why people would call an individual "soul" (Greek ψυχή) as well as "head." For, though both "soul" and "head" could be thought to rule or govern the other parts of the body, the soul would not be thought of as the most prominent or principal part of a human being. Finally, the immediate context shows that Plutarch is making a comparison with the part of the wine that gives it its power: he explains that when the lees are filtered out of wine, "some substance that constitutes the edge and power (Greek κράτος "strength") of the wine is removed and lost in the process of filtering. . . . The ancients even went so far as to call wine 'lees,' just as we affectionately call a person 'soul' or 'head' from his ruling parts." In each case the metaphor is drawn not from the "principal" part of the thing named but from the dominating or strongest part of the thing named.

(9) 3 Kgdms (1 Kgs) 8:1 (Alexandrinus): "Then Solomon assembled the elders of Israel and all the *heads* of the tribes."²²

Cervin says that this statement "does not even have anything to do with 'leaders.' The word 'heads' is used of the tops of rods or staffs! This example must be rejected also" (p. 97).²³

But Cervin's interpretation is hardly persuasive at this point: it would make the sentence say, "Then King Solomon assembled all the elders of Israel with all the *tops* that had been raised up of the staffs of the fathers of the children of Israel." Did the Septuagint translators really think that Solomon had called together all the elders and all the tops of their staffs? Cervin fails to understand that "staff" here in the Septuagint (ῥάβδος) is being used in the sense of "staff of office" (see Ps 44 (45):7; 109 (110):2; LSJ, p. 1562), and represents the "tribes" of Israel, similar to the way the Hebrew word here (שָׂרֵפָה, "staff") can mean "tribe" (so BDB, p. 641). The LXX here simply means that Moses assembled the elders "with the *heads* that had been raised up of the tribes of the fathers of the children of Israel." The heads of these tribes are of course the leaders of the tribes.

This text, therefore, is a legitimate one, and the "heads" of the tribes refer to the rulers or leaders of those tribes of Israel.

(15) Isa 9:13 (14): "And the Lord took away from Israel *head* and tail, great and small in one day, the elder and those who marvel at the people."

Cervin says, "Isaiah is using a 'head-tail' metaphor (hence the translation of κεφαλή), *not* an authority metaphor" (p. 98).

But Cervin here introduces a false dichotomy. We do not need to choose between a "head-tail" metaphor and an "authority metaphor," because a "head-tail" metaphor simply functions as a more full metaphor for "leader-follower." The head is a metaphor for the one who leads or rules, and the tail is a metaphor for the one who follows or obeys. In this text the leaders and rulers of the people are referred to as the "head," and the example is a legitimate one.

(17) T. Reuben 2:2: "The seven spirits of deceit are the 'heads' or 'leaders' of the works of innovation (or 'rebellion')."

Cervin says, "There is nothing in this text which is remotely political, social, or military, and so the translation 'leader' which Grudem advocates is not justified. In fact, the notion of 'source' is much more appropriate to the context, the seven spirits being the 'source' of rebellion. This example must be rejected" (p. 99).

However, Cervin fails to recognize that demonic spirits can certainly be thought of as leaders or rulers over works of "rebellion" (or "innovation," Greek νεωτερισμός). The context is one of spiritual rulership or authority. This makes the translation "leader"

²²For a discussion of the textual variant, see above, p. 23, note 20.

²³Payne ("Response," 123) adopts the same interpretation as Cervin regarding this verse.

(which I initially quoted from the translation of R. H. Charles²⁴) a very good possibility. However, I agree that other senses such as "beginning" or even "source" would also fit in this context, and the context is not decisive enough to tell one way or another. Therefore this example should be reclassified as one in which the meaning "authority over" is possible but not required.

(19) Philo, *Moses* 2.30: "As the *head* is the ruling place in the living body, so Ptolemy [Ptolemy Philadelphos] became among kings."

Cervin does not think that "head" means "ruler" here because "Philo says that Philadelphos is the *head* of kings, not in the sense of ruling them, but as the *preeminent* king among the rest. Philadelphos is the *top* of the kings just as the head is the *top* of an animal's body. . . . This example is therefore to be rejected" (p. 100).

While Cervin's explanation at first seems plausible, it does not do justice to the actual words Philo uses. In fact Philo calls the head τὸ ἡγεμόνευον . . . τρόπον, "the ruling place" in the body — a phrase that Cervin simply skips over and fails to translate in his own rendering of the passage (p. 100). But the adjectival participle ἡγεμόνευον here certainly has the sense of "leading" or "ruling," since the verb ἡγεμονεύω means "lead the way, rule, command" (LSJ, 762).

On the other hand, Cervin says that his suggestion that *head* here is used "as a metaphor of preeminence" is "fully in keeping with the use of κεφαλή as defined in LSJ" (p. 99). However, one searches in vain for such a definition in the LSJ lexicon — it simply is not there (see the summary of meanings given in the LSJ article on p. 000 above). It would seem a better lexical procedure to stick with previously recognized and well-attested senses for κεφαλή if that is possible in the context in which we find the word, rather than postulating new meanings which might seem to be possible in a few instances but have not proved themselves convincing to any lexicographers in the hundreds of years in which the Greek language has been studied. Moreover, it seems that it would have been more appropriate for Cervin to notify readers that he was proposing a new meaning previously unrecognized in the lexicons than to say that this meaning "is fully in keeping with the use of κεφαλή as defined in LSJ" (p. 99), when it is simply not there.

(21-22) Philo, *On Rewards and Punishments* 125: "The virtuous one, whether single man or people, will be the *head* of the human race and all the others will be like the parts of the body which are animated by the powers in and above the head."

Cervin says, "It is fairly clear that 'head' here is the source of life. . . . Whether or not 'head' is taken to mean 'source' in this passage, Philo's simile of the animal and his statement that the head is 'the first and best part' makes it clear that 'preeminence' is

²⁴R. H. Charles, *Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1913) 297.

Philo's point, not 'authority.' The 'virtuous one' will be preeminent among the human race. These examples must be rejected" (p. 101).

Here Cervin proposes two definitions: "source" and "preeminence," and it is not clear which one he is advocating. If it is "preeminence," then again it must be said that this meaning might possibly be an overlapping nuance that accompanies the "head" metaphor in this context, but it is probably not a necessary sense (it is not previously attested in any Greek lexicon) and it certainly is not the only nuance suggested in the metaphor here.

In fact, the context suggests much more than fame or preeminence — the rest of the human race is dependent in some way on this virtuous person or people. More explicit understanding of the meaning of "head" here is found when we recognize the larger context of Philo's discussion. The entire treatise *On Rewards and Punishments* is a discussion of the rewards God promised the people of Israel for obedience and the punishments which were promised in the case of disobedience. This particular section begins with an allusion to the fact that the mind of wisdom "was not dragged down tailwards but lifted up to the head" (124), an allusion to the promise in Deut 28:13 that if the people of Israel would be faithful to God, "the Lord your God will make you the head and not the tail" (compare Deut 28:44).²⁵ Then Philo says that "these last words contain an allegory and are figuratively expressed" (125). He then goes on to explain the allegory in the quotation that follows.

For our purposes it is significant that this passage in Deuteronomy 28 contains much about the people of Israel ruling over the nations and having the nations serve them if God exalts them to be the "head" and not the "tail" (see Deut 28:7, 10; and contrast with vv. 43-44). There certainly is an idea of preeminence in this context but it is preeminence that includes leadership and rule over the nations, and Cervin wrongly attempts to force a distinction between preeminence and leadership in this context.

But is the meaning "source" a better translation of κεφαλή in this context? Certainly the text does say that the rest of the human race will be like the limbs of a body which are animated by the powers "in and above the head." But the verb which I here translate "animated" (Greek ψυχόω) can simply mean "give understanding or wisdom" in Philo (see, for example, *On the Creation* 9; *On the Virtues* 14; *Who Is the Heir* 185). This makes sense in the context: the virtuous man or people will be exalted by God to be the "head" and will thus be a leader who gives direction and wisdom to the rest of the human race — they will be quickened and directed by the powers and wisdom in this man or nation.

The idea of "source" does not fit the context nearly as well, both because no one would think that the *head* of an animal was the "source" of the entire animal, and because no one would think that a

²⁵So also the editor in the Loeb Classical Library edition, p. 388, note c.

virtuous man exalted to leadership in the human race was the "source" of the human race! In both cases it is the leadership function that is in view when God makes one the "head" and not the "tail."

Given this larger context, it still seems most appropriate to conclude that Philo here uses the expression "head of the human race" to mean "leader of the human race," certainly not "source of the human race" (which would hardly make sense), and very likely not "preeminent one" (at least not "preeminent one" without leadership or authority in the human race). Cervin is incorrect to reject this example as "false."

What are we to conclude concerning the twelve examples that Cervin classified as "false"? Five of them should be put in a separate category of examples where a person's "head" is said to rule over his or her body (examples 3, 18, 20, 28, 29). Two examples should be classified as "possible" but not clear or certain examples of κεφαλή meaning "leader" or "authority over" (examples 1, 17). The remaining five examples (9, 15, 19, 21, 22) remain legitimate examples of the meaning "leader."

5. Seven Examples That Cervin Considers Illegitimate

The first three examples are from Plutarch:

(24-25) Plutarch, *Cicero* 14.4: Catiline says to Cicero, criticizing the Senate as weak and the people as strong, "There are two bodies, one lean and wasted, but with a *head*, and the other headless but strong and large. What am I doing wrong if I myself become a *head* for this?" In saying this, Catiline was threatening to become the head of the people and thus to lead the people in revolt against Cicero. Therefore, "Cicero was all the more alarmed."

(27) Plutarch, *Agis* 2.5: A ruler who follows popular opinions is compared to a serpent whose tail "rebelled against the head" and insisted on leading the body instead of it being led by the head. The serpent consequently harmed itself. The implication is that a ruler should be like the "head" of a serpent and thereby lead the people.

Regarding the first two instances Cervin admits that κεφαλή is "used by Cataline for a *leader* (himself)" (p. 101), but he then goes on to object that these two examples are illegitimate, first of all, because "Cataline's answer was in the form of a 'riddle,' as Plutarch points out" (p. 102). Then Cervin adds, "Secondly, and more importantly, Cataline was speaking *in Latin*, not Greek," and Cervin then provides a parallel passage from Cicero, concerning which he concludes, "It is entirely possible that Plutarch used this passage as source material for his *Life of Cicero*, and it is equally possible that Plutarch translated the Latin rather literally for the sake of the 'riddle.' If this were so, then this use of *head* for 'lead-

er' is really a Latin metaphor, and not a Greek one. . . . These examples are therefore illegitimate" (p. 102).

First, whether the answer was a riddle or not, it is evident that Cicero understood it because he was immediately alarmed. We may assume that Plutarch also expected his readers to understand it.

The objection that this may have been translated from Latin does not make the example an illegitimate one for Greek. Cervin's objection here is similar to his objection to the use of Septuagint examples because the Septuagint was a translation from Hebrew. In both cases the translators were writing to be understood by those into whose language they were making the translation. Certainly it is true that Plutarch's extensive historical writings are in Greek that would be understandable to Plutarch's readers, and whether or not the text was based on some Latin source material is not nearly as relevant as Cervin would have us think. The examples here remain valid examples of κεφαλή meaning "ruler, authority over" — in this case referring to authority over the Roman empire itself.

The third example, regarding the serpent whose tail led the head, is certainly not a direct metaphor in which κεφαλή means "leader." It is closest to a simile in which Plutarch explains that a leader who is also a follower is like a serpent that follows its tail rather than its head. The example is of some importance to us because the leader is compared to the head of a serpent, but it is better classified as a simile (similar to example 23 [Plutarch, *Pelopidas* 2. 1. 3], above).

The remaining four examples that Cervin classifies as "illegitimate" are from Aquila's Greek translation of the OT: Cervin objects that these are illegitimate examples "for the simple reason that Aquila's Greek translation of the OT was so slavishly literal that it was incomprehensible to native Greeks! . . . These examples from Aquila must therefore be rejected" (p. 105).

Although Cervin is right to caution us about the use of Aquila, he has greatly overstated the case. Though Aquila's translation was quite woodenly literal so that his grammatical constructions were at times foreign to Greek, his translation is not entirely without linguistic value for us. We must remember that "the Jews . . . held this translation in the highest esteem."²⁶ Moreover, Aquila himself was a Gentile who was a native Greek speaker long before he learned Hebrew.²⁷ Nor was he ignorant of the large vocabulary available in the Greek of his time:

That the crudities of Aquila's style are not due to an insufficient vocabulary is clear from his ready use of words belonging to the classi-

²⁶"History of the Septuagint Text," in Alfred Rahlfs, *Septuaginta* (Stuttgart: Württembergische Bibelanstalt, 1965) xxvi.

²⁷H. B. Swete, *An Introduction to the Old Testament in Greek* (Cambridge: University Press, 1900) 31.

cal or the literary type when they appear to him to correspond to the Hebrew more closely than the colloquialisms of the LXX.²⁸

One wonders if Cervin's concern to dismiss these examples from Aquila has not led to some overstatement concerning Aquila's translation. An interesting example is seen in the comparison of two sentences. The first comes from the essay, "History of the Septuagint Text" in the preface to the Rahlfs edition (p. xxvi): "Aquila's translation of the Bible must on occasions have proved altogether incomprehensible to Non-Jews." Cervin has apparently read this essay (for he quotes a sentence from a location two pages earlier in the essay), but his statement tells readers not that Aquila's translation "on occasions" was incomprehensible, but that the entire translation was incomprehensible: He says, "Aquila's Greek translation of the OT was so slavishly literal that it was incomprehensible to native Greeks!" (p. 105). Certainly this is an overstatement, since the translation was used widely for centuries by Greek-speaking Jews.

It seems best to conclude that these examples from Aquila are of some value, though their weight as evidence is limited, both because of Aquila's translation style, and because they come somewhat after the time of the NT (second century AD). It would not be appropriate to call them "illegitimate" examples, as Cervin does.

In conclusion, regarding the seven examples that Cervin calls "illegitimate," one (number 27) is better classified as a simile and the remaining six should be seen as legitimate examples, though those from Aquila are less weighty than others.

6. Two examples that Cervin claims do not exist

Mr. Cervin has correctly pointed out that, in my original article, I incorrectly counted two examples where the word "head" was repeated in the English text but in fact the word κεφαλή was not found a second time in the Greek text itself. These two examples were the *second* instance of the word "head" in each of the following quotations:

(2) Herodotus 7.148: "guarding your *head* from the blow; and the *head* shall shelter the body."

In this example the synonym κάρη is used instead of κεφαλή.

(16) Isa 9:14-16: "so the Lord cut off from Israel *head* and tail . . . the elder and honored man is the *head*."

In this sentence the Greek word κεφαλή does not appear a second time.

²⁸H. B. Swete, *Introduction*, 39-40.

In writing the original article, I examined all the occurrences in the original Greek text, then listed the English translation for each one, then made a final enumeration of the instances listed. But as I counted, in the two texts mentioned here I had failed to note that κεφαλή only represented one of the two occurrences of the word “head” in the English text. This was simply an unintentional oversight on my part. I am happy to correct this error in tabulation, and note here that these two examples should be dropped from my tally.

7. *One example which Cervin says “cannot be decided”*

Here Cervin lists the following example:

(35) Theodotion, Judg 10:18: “He will be *head* over all the inhabitants of Gilead.”

Cervin says of this, “Citing one verse by Theodotion tells us nothing. . . . The crucial question is how consistent is he in translating רִאשׁוֹן into Greek? . . . Until more is known about Theodotion’s translation(s) of רִאשׁוֹן , judgment must be suspended on this example” (p. 105).

This is a puzzling statement. Cervin admits that Theodotion’s translation was not as literal as Aquila’s, and we know that it was written to be understood by Greek-speaking Jews in the second century AD. One wonders what the basis is upon which Cervin makes the statement, “Citing one verse by Theodotion tells us nothing.” Since Theodotion, like most of the NT writers, was a Greek-speaking Jew, citing one verse by Theodotion (second century AD) probably tells us more about word usage by the NT authors (first century AD) than citing one passage in Herodotus (fifth century BC), to which Cervin gives so much weight. It is fair to conclude that this remains a legitimate example.

Where does this leave us with regard to the forty-nine examples of κεφαλή referred to in my original article? At this point we have the following tally:

Legitimate examples	36
Possible examples	2
Head as a simile for leader	2
Literal head said to rule over body	5
Illegitimate examples (two very late, two do not exist)	4

But in addition to these examples, the following should be added from the study by Joseph Fitzmyer, which Cervin discusses at the end of his article²⁹:

Jer 31:7 (LXX 38:7): "Rejoice and shout over the *head* of the nations."

Deut 28:12-13: "And you shall lend to many nations, but you shall not borrow. And the Lord will make you the *head*, and not the tail."

Deut 28:43-45: "The sojourner who is among you shall mount above you higher and higher; and you shall come down lower and lower. He shall lend to you, and you shall not lend to him; he shall be the *head*, and you shall be the tail. All these curses shall come upon you."

Josephus, *War* 4.261: Jerusalem is the "*head* of the whole nation."

These four examples may be added to the thirty-six legitimate examples listed above, bringing that total to forty. In addition, as I explain below,³⁰ the articles by Payne and the Mickelsens have caused me to think Lam 1:5 should also be included here: [of Jerusalem] "Her foes have become the *head*, her enemies prosper."

This would bring the total to forty-one.

Moreover, one passage from Philo quoted by Fitzmyer should be noted:

Philo, *The Special Laws* 184: "Nature conferred the sovereignty of the body on the head."

This example should be added to the category "literal head ruling over the body," bringing that total to six.

So the tally now should be:

Legitimate examples	41
Possible examples	2
Head as a simile for leader	2
Literal head said to rule over body	6
Illegitimate examples (two very late, two do not exist)	4

²⁹I did not include these examples in my earlier article because they seemed to me possibly to represent prominence instead of rule or authority. But reexamination of the contexts, and the realization that exaltation to high position in the OT seems inevitably to carry with it some idea of authority as well, have convinced me that authority is in view in these examples also.

³⁰p. 45, n. 51.

D. THE MEANING "PREEMINENT" AS PROPOSED BY CERVIN

1. Cervin's Proposal

At the end of his article Cervin writes,

What then does Paul mean by his use of *head* in his letters? He does not mean "authority over," as the traditionalists assert, nor does he mean "source" as the egalitarians assert. I think that he is merely employing a head-body metaphor and that his point is *preeminence*. This is fully in keeping with the normal and "common" usage of the word. Both Plutarch and Philo use *head* in this way and this usage is listed in Liddell-Scott-Jones (with other references). (p. 112)

The problem with this definition is that it is simply not found in the Liddell-Scott lexicon as Cervin claims. His statement that it is listed there "with other references" is, as far as I can tell, simply false (see LSJ, 945, and the summary of meanings listed in that article which I gave above, p. 000). Moreover, so far as I know, the meaning "preeminent" is not found in any specialty lexicons for any period of the Greek language either (unlike κεφαλή with the meaning "leader, authority over" which is found in many if not all specialty lexicons for the NT and Patristic periods). Why then does Cervin suggest this meaning and claim that it is common and is found in the Liddell-Scott lexicon?³¹

One begins to wonder if there is not a commitment to find *any other* meaning than the meaning "authority over, leader" which gives us the sense — so unpopular in our modern culture — that the "husband is the authority over his wife, as Christ is the authority over the church" (Eph 5:23). Just as the Mickelsens in 1979 and 1981, in arguing against the meaning "authority over" for κεφαλή in the NT, proposed a new meaning ("source") that no lexicon in history had *ever* proposed in the category of definitions referring to persons, so now Cervin in this most recent article has rejected the meaning "leader, authority over" which is evident in so many texts, and has again proposed a meaning never before seen in any lexicon.

³¹In subsequent personal correspondence to me (6/5/90), Mr. Cervin agrees that "preeminence" is not a meaning given in LSJ, and indicates that on reconsideration he now thinks the meaning "prominence" would be more appropriate, because this meaning "does not carry the overtone of superiority which is implicit in [the meaning preeminence]." Cervin indicates that, although this meaning "prominence" is not given in LSJ either, it seems to him a "valid aspect" of the Greek metaphorical use of κεφαλή because it is closely related to the idea of being the physical "top" or "end" of a person or object, and therefore the idea of prominence is "implicit in the metaphor." In response, the same objections given above seem to me also to apply to this new suggestion: though it may be an "overtone" of the metaphor, it is not a necessary meaning, it has never been suggested in any lexicon, and, in any case, when applied to persons it cannot be dissociated from the dominant sense of "authority, leader, ruler." Why must people search for any meaning but "authority over"?

Moreover, just as the Mickelsens earlier alleged (without evidence) that their new meaning "source" was "common" in Greek literature,³² so now Mr. Cervin has asserted that his new meaning is "fully in keeping with the use of κεφαλή as defined in LSJ" (p. 99). But this meaning is simply not there.

2. *The Existence of Overtones in Metaphors*

Is it necessary then for us to deny that there is any nuance of "preeminence" (or perhaps "prominence") in the uses of κεφαλή? Certainly not — for one who is in a position of authority often has some prominence as well. In fact, it is the nature of a metaphor to speak of one thing in terms of another with which it has some shared characteristics. Thus, if someone were to call her boss a "drill sergeant," she might be implying that he shares more than one characteristic of a drill sergeant — he might be thought to be not only very demanding, but also (perhaps) highly disciplined, uncaring — and even given to barking commands in a loud voice. Part of the strength of a metaphor derives from the fact that there are often multiple nuances associated with it.

Therefore it would not be surprising if, when first century people referred to someone as "the head," there would be nuances not only of authority but perhaps also of prominence or "preeminence" as well. But the notions of leadership, rule, and authority were so closely connected with the idea of prominence or preeminence in the ancient world that it would probably be impossible to separate them decisively at any point. Moreover, it must be recognized as significant that there are few if any examples where a person is called κεφαλή and the context shows preeminence *without* rule or authority. In the examples we have looked at, those who are called "head" are those with utmost authority in the situation in question — the general of an army, the king of Egypt, the Roman emperor, the father in a family, the bishop in a church (in the patristic examples given by Lampe), the heads of the tribes of Israel, the king of Israel, or (with cities) the capital city of a country. Moreover, we have the examples of Christ as the head of the church and the head of all universal power and authority. Someone might wish to argue that the notion of "preeminence" is an "overtone" in many of these passages in addition to the primary suggestion of "authority" or "leader" or "ruler." That may well be so. But to argue that head means "preeminent one" *without any nuance of leadership or authority* seems clearly to fly in the face of an abundance of evidence both from the NT and from numerous other ancient texts.

Moreover, is not this previously unknown meaning "preeminent" really contradictory to some very important NT teaching? The idea

³²Berkeley Mickelsen and Alvera Mickelsen, "Does Male Dominance Tarnish Our Translations?" *Christianity Today*, 5 October, 1979, 23.

of “preeminence” suggests status and importance and honor, and if we were to say that the husband’s headship means primarily that he is *preeminent* over his wife we would almost have to conclude that the husband had greater status and importance and honor than the wife. Yet this is certainly not what the NT teaches about male/female relationships — men and women are “joint heirs” of the grace of life (1 Pet 3:7), and are “all one in Christ Jesus” (Gal 3:28). In arguing for “preeminence,” Mr. Cervin is ultimately arguing for a very distasteful kind of male chauvinism which has no place in NT teaching or in the Christian church. Not only is this meaning (1) not required by the data and (2) previously unknown to the lexicons, it also (3) gives us a significant theological problem. If accepted, such a meaning would tend to push people toward rejection of Paul’s writings on marriage as authoritative for today — a direction that Cervin himself seems to hint at in the last paragraph in his article:

It might be objected that *preeminence* does not fit the context of 1 Corinthians 11. How can the husband be *preeminent* over his wife? In the context of the male-dominant culture of which Paul was a part, such a usage would not be inappropriate. . . . Just because *we* might have difficulty with a given metaphor does not mean that Paul would have had the same difficulty; it is after all *his* metaphor, not ours. (p. 112)

Personally I refuse to accept for myself any distancing of Paul’s metaphor from my own personal convictions. Because these words are *Scripture* I want Paul’s metaphor to become *my* metaphor as well, not one with which I have “difficulty,” but one which I can fully embrace and rejoice in. I can do that with the sense “leader, authority over,” because (as I and others have extensively explained elsewhere) the idea of difference in authority is fully consistent with the idea of equality in honor and importance. But I cannot do that so easily with *preeminence*, because it inherently suggests greater status and honor and importance for the one that is preeminent.

E. SOME INACCURATE REPRESENTATIONS OF MY ARTICLE

For the sake of completeness and factual accuracy, it is probably appropriate to mention here a few points at which Cervin seems (to me at least) to have represented my original article inaccurately.

First, regarding the use of Greek texts and translations, Cervin says the following:

Grudem further states that the Loeb editions were used by him “where available; otherwise, standard texts *and translations were used*” (p. 65, emphasis mine). I find the last phrase of this sentence

very disturbing. *One cannot* conduct a word-study of Greek (or *any* foreign language) by using translations! *One must* have the original text!. (p. 88)

This statement contains an allegation that I used translations *without Greek texts*. This is simply a conclusion based on a misreading of my original sentence. I did not say that I used "standard texts or translations," but that I used "standard texts *and* translations." The original printout that I received from the TLG data base was entirely in Greek, and I did not in any case cite a translation without first consulting the Greek text itself.³³

Second, Cervin says, regarding the Liddell-Scott lexicon,

. . . Grudem has demonstrated that he does not really understand the significance of LSJ. Grudem wrongly claims that LSJ "emphasizes classical Greek" (*ibid.*). This is not so. LSJ is the *only* comprehensive Greek-English lexicon of *Ancient* Greek currently available. While LSJ was originally planned to cover only Classical Greek, it currently covers . . . a time span of roughly 1400 years, 800 B.C. to A.D. 600. (p. 86)

In fact, I said the same thing in the earlier part of the same sentence that Cervin quoted. I wrote:

In fact, Liddell-Scott is the standard lexicon for all of Greek literature from about 700 B.C. to about A.D. 600 with emphasis on classical Greek authors in the seven centuries prior to the NT. (p. 47)

One may quibble about the relative emphasis placed on Greek writers prior to the NT, but my point was only to say that it is not nearly as detailed a lexicon in the NT and early Christian literature as some specialty lexicons such as Bauer-Arndt-Gingrich-Danker. I was making this point *only* to critique the Mickelsens who (in their 1979 article) quoted *only* LSJ for the meaning of a NT word, and failed to inform their readers that their point could not have been supported by any specialty lexicon covering the time of the NT.

Finally, Cervin objects to my suggestion that the adjective κεφαλαιος more commonly meant "leader" than the noun κεφαλή in

³³The existence of this unusual allegation in Mr. Cervin's article is particularly puzzling since I informed him in more detail about my procedure before he corrected the article for publication. In fact, this correspondence apparently led to a further footnote (p. 111, note 38), in which he says, "Grudem explains (p. e.) that he had based his count on English translations rather than on the Greek text." The impression given the reader is that my entire summary was "based on" counting English translations, whereas what I explained in the letter to Mr. Cervin was simply what I have said above regarding the two examples that do not exist (see above pp. 34-35), namely, that after I had listed all my examples for the article my counting erroneously included two examples where the word "head" was repeated a second time in the English text. But the entire compilation of examples was certainly "based on" original Greek texts.

the centuries before the NT. Cervin objects that "nouns and adjectives are not always used in the same ways" (p. 107) — but I did not argue that they always are, only that there are examples which showed a similar meaning in *this* case. Then Cervin says, "Second, Paul did not use the adjective, he used the noun" (p. 107) — but I did not claim otherwise. Cervin here simply misses my point, which was that there was a related term that was earlier used in the sense of "authority, leader" but that by the time of the NT the noun κεφαλή was quite clearly used in this sense as well.

Where does this leave us? I am grateful that Cervin's article has provided some helpful corrections to my earlier article, but the major point of his article, namely, that κεφαλή cannot mean "authority over, leader," and must rather mean "preeminent one," is disproved by the existence of improper methodology and several internal inconsistencies in his argument, and is contradicted by an abundance of evidence, and must therefore be rejected.

III. RESPONSE TO OTHER RECENT STUDIES

A. Articles Since 1985

I have listed here several articles written or published after my 1985 article, especially those that have contributed to the discussion within the evangelical world.

1. (1986) Berkeley and Alvera Mickelsen, "What Does *Kephale* Mean in the NT?" in *Women, Authority, and the Bible*, 97-110.
2. (1986) Ruth A. Tucker, "Response," in *Women, Authority, and the Bible*, 111-17.
3. (1986) Philip B. Payne, "Response," in *Women, Authority, and the Bible*, 118-32.
4. (1986) Walter L. Liefeld, "Women, Submission, and Ministry in 1 Corinthians," in *Women, Authority, and the Bible*, 134-54.
5. (1986/1990) Gilbert Bilezikian, "A Critical Examination of Wayne Grudem's treatment of *kephale* in Ancient Greek Texts," Appendix to *Beyond Sex Roles* (2nd ed.; Grand Rapids: Baker, 1990) 215-52.³⁴
6. (1987) Catherine Clark Kroeger, "The Classical Concept of *Head* as 'Source,'" Appendix III in *Equal to Serve*, by Gretchen Gaebelein Hull (Old Tappan, NJ: Revell, 1987) 267-83.

³⁴This was an address given at the Evangelical Theological Society meeting in Atlanta, October 20, 1986, to which I gave one of the scheduled responses. (My written critique below contains the major substance of my oral response given at that time.)

7. (1987) Gordon D. Fee, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians* (NIC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1987) 501-5 [commentary on 1 Cor 11:3].
8. (1989) Joseph Fitzmyer, "Another Look at ΚΕΦΑΛΗ in 1 Cor 11:3," *NTS* 35 (1989) 503-11.
9. (1989) Peter Cotterell and Max Turner, *Linguistics and Biblical Interpretation*, 141-45.
10. (1988) Recent lexicons by Bauer (1988) and Louw-Nida (1988).

B. ANALYSIS OF RECENT ARTICLES

1. (1986) Berkeley and Alvera Mickelsen, "What Does *Kephale* Mean in the NT?"³⁵

In their 1979 and 1981 articles in *Christianity Today*, Berkeley and Alvera Mickelsen exerted wide influence in the evangelical world by arguing that "head" in the NT often meant "source," but never "authority over." I responded to those articles in my earlier study.³⁶ But in this 1986 article they give further development of what I will call "the Septuagint argument," an argument only briefly used in 1981.

a. "The Septuagint Argument"

This is an argument that is also used by Philip Payne³⁷ (Article 3 above) and by Gordon Fee in his commentary on 1 Corinthians³⁸ (Article 7 above). It may be summarized this way:

The Septuagint translators used κεφαλή to translate the Hebrew word רִאשׁוֹן ("head") in a sense of "leader" or "ruler" only eight out of the 180 cases³⁹ in which Hebrew רִאשׁוֹן means "leader" or "authority over." In all the other cases they used some other words, most commonly ἄρχων, "ruler" (109 times). Therefore, since the Septuagint translators had about 180 opportunities to use κεφαλή meaning "leader," and they only did so eight times, it shows that the translators had a desire to avoid κεφαλή in the sense of "authority" or "leader over."

³⁵It should be noted that though the publication date of *Women, Authority, and the Bible*, in which articles 1-4 appear, is 1986, the essays were written for a conference in 1984, before most of the authors had access to my 1985 article.

³⁶Pp. 46-47, 52-53.

³⁷Payne, "Response," 121-24.

³⁸Fee, *First Corinthians*, 502-3.

³⁹The Mickelsens use the number eight out of 180; Payne (p. 123) uses nine, but the form of the argument is the same.

The Mickelsens, Philip Payne, and Gordon Fee all see this as a significant point: the Mickelsens say it shows that “the Septuagint translators recognized that *kephalē* did not carry the Hebrew meaning of leader, authority or superior rank.”⁴⁰ Philip Payne says, “When the OT meaning of *ro’sh* was ‘leader,’ the Septuagint translators realized quite clearly that this would not be conveyed by *kephalē*, so they resorted to some other translation in 171 cases out of 180.”⁴¹ Fee says that the Septuagint translators “almost never” used κεφαλή to translate Hebrew מֶלֶךְ “when ‘ruler’ was intended, thus indicating that this metaphorical sense is an exceptional usage and not part of the ordinary range of meanings for the Greek word.”⁴²

Several points of response may be made to this argument:

(1) The fact that the Septuagint translators used another word much more commonly to translate מֶלֶךְ when it meant “leader” is not that significant when we realize that ἄρχων was the common word that *literally* meant “leader,” whereas κεφαλή only meant “leader” in a metaphorical sense. It is true that the Septuagint translators preferred ἄρχων to mean “authority,” as I noted in my earlier article (p. 47, n. 17). But I have never claimed, nor has anyone else claimed, that κεφαλή was the most common word for “ruler.” In fact, the most common word for “ruler,” the one that *literally* meant “ruler,” was ἄρχων. It is not at all surprising that in contexts where the Hebrew word for “head” meant “ruler,” it was frequently translated by ἄρχων. All I have claimed is that κεφαλή could also mean “ruler” or “authority” in a metaphorical sense of “head.” It is not the most common, but it is a clearly recognizable and clearly understood word in that sense. The fact that a word that *literally* meant “ruler, authority” (ἄρχων) should be used much more often than a word that *metaphorically* meant “ruler, authority” (κεφαλή) should not be surprising — it is only surprising that people have made an argument of it at all.

(2) The Mickelsens and the others who have used this Septuagint argument fail to note that these eight examples are many compared to the Septuagintal examples of κεφαλή used to mean “source,” of which there are none. No one who has made this Septuagint argument has mentioned this fact. To use an athletic analogy,

⁴⁰“What Does Kephale Mean?” 104.

⁴¹Payne, “Response,” 123. In footnote 35, p. 123, Payne explains that he only counts “nine exceptions” (verses where κεφαλή means “leader”): Judg 11:11; 2 Sam 22:44; Ps 18:43; Isa 7:8, 9; Lam 1:5; Deut 28:13, 44; and Isa 9:14, because five others are in variant readings found in some but not all manuscripts (Judg 10:18; 11:8, 9; 1 Kgs [LXX 3 Kgdms] 8:1; 20:12), and he thinks that in yet three others (Deut 32:42; 1 Chr 12:19; Ps 140:10) the word refers to the physical head and is not a metaphor for “leader” or “authority” (in these last three he is correct, and I did not cite those as examples of “leader”).

⁴²First Corinthians, 503.

if the score at the end of a baseball game is 8-0, one begins to wonder why anyone would declare the team with zero to be the winner because the team with eight did not score enough runs. Yet that is what the Mickelsens (and Payne, pp. 121-24, and Fee, pp. 502-3) conclude with respect to κεφαλή meaning "authority over" — they just say that the eight examples meaning "authority over" are very few, and fail to tell their readers that their preferred meaning "source" has no occurrences in the Septuagint.

(3) Those who make this argument also fail to mention that in Gen 2:10, when the Hebrew term מְנוּחַ means "source" or "beginning" (of rivers), the Septuagint translators used another term, ἀρχή, "source, beginning," not κεφαλή, "head."⁴³

(4) When those who make this argument from the Septuagint give the number of occurrences of κεφαλή meaning "authority" or "leader" in the LXX as eight, they give a misleadingly low number. The Mickelsens and Payne arrive at their low numbers by dismissing five texts⁴⁴ where there are textual variants (apparently Judg 10:18; 11:8, 9; 1 Kgs [LXX 3 Kgdms] 8:1, and one of the instances in

⁴³This is also the case when referring to a related idea, the "beginning point" of something, such as the "beginning" of a night watch (Judg 7:19; Lam 2:19), or the "beginning" of a period of time (Isa 40:21; 41:4, 26; 48:16; 1 Chr 16:7, etc.).

This is interesting in light of the use of κεφαλή in *Orphic Fragments* 21a, where κεφαλή seems to mean "beginning" or "first in a series" (see below). If this meaning was commonly recognized at the time of the LXX, then κεφαλή could also have been used in these texts, but ἀρχή was preferred by the translators.

We should also note that when the NT wants to say that Christ became "the source of eternal salvation" (Heb 5:9), it uses not κεφαλή but a perfectly good Greek word meaning "source," αἴτιος, "source, cause." This does not of course prove that κεφαλή could not also mean source in a metaphorical sense, but it shows that in both OT (Gen 2:10) and NT (Heb 5:9) where there is a text that unambiguously speaks of "source" in the sense that the Mickelsens and others claim that κεφαλή takes, the term used is not κεφαλή but something that means "source" without question.

Philip Payne ("Response," 119, n. 21) quotes S. C. Woodhouse, *English-Greek Dictionary* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1932²) to show that κεφαλή does not mean "authority" or "chief." Although we think that to be an oversight in light of the examples we earlier adduced, Payne should perhaps also have mentioned that Woodhouse lists under "source of rivers, etc.," πηγῆ, κρηνή, , and κρουνός and under "origin" ἀρχή, πηγῆ, and ρίζα ("root"), but not κεφαλή in either case. It does not seem fair to cite Woodhouse to show lack of support on one side but fail to note that he gives no support to the other side either.

Moreover, Payne fails to tell the reader that Woodhouse's *Dictionary* is written to help students write compositions in Attic Greek, and is specifically taken from the vocabulary of authors "from Aeschylus to Demosthenes" (pp. v, vi) (ca. 500 BC-322 BC). It does not cover the Koine Greek of the NT at all. Such a citation is troubling in a widely-read popular book, for it conveys to the non-specialist reader an appearance of scholarly investigation while in actual fact there is little substantive relevance for it in the present discussion.

⁴⁴The Mickelsens actually dismiss six texts as having textual variants (p. 104), but they do not specify which those are. I am using the number five from the response by Philip Payne (pp. 122-23).

Isa. 7:8).⁴⁵ Yet it should be noted that these “variant readings” are in Codex Alexandrinus, one of the three great ancient manuscripts of the Septuagint.⁴⁶ Moreover, there seems to be an inconsistency on the part of these authors when they dismiss these variant readings but fail to mention that the single text they most strongly appeal to for showing that κεφαλή can mean “source” (*Orphic Fragments* 21a, “Zeus the κεφαλή . . .”) also has κεφαλή only as a variant reading, with ἀρχή in other manuscripts. In short, there is no good reason not to count these additional five examples of κεφαλή meaning “authority” as well. This gives a total of thirteen in the LXX.

Furthermore, the Mickelsens dismiss three texts where God tells the people he will make them “the head and not the tail” with respect to the other nations, or, in punishment, will make other nations the “head” and them the “tail” (Deut 28:13, 44; Isa 9:14).⁴⁷ They say that “head” here is just used to complete the metaphor: it “would not make sense without the use of head in contrast to tail.”⁴⁸ But Payne seems right to admit these three examples,⁴⁹ since they just extend the metaphor to include “tail” as “follower, one ruled over” as well as using “head” to mean “leader, ruler” (especially in the context of nations who rule other nations).⁵⁰ Allowing for a correction on one of the Septuagint instances I earlier counted, I have now adjusted my own count of instances in the Septuagint to sixteen instead of the earlier thirteen.⁵¹

Those sixteen instances of κεφαλή meaning “authority over” in the Septuagint are the following:

(1) Deut 28:13: [in relationship to other nations] “And the Lord will make you the *head*, and not the tail; and you shall tend upward only, and not downward; if you obey the commandments of the Lord your God, which I command you this day.” (Compare with the following passage, where rule and authority are in view.)

⁴⁵They do not specify exactly which texts they are not counting because of textual variants, but these five do have variants in the readings of Codex Alexandrinus, one of the major ancient manuscripts of the Septuagint.

⁴⁶The second instance in Isa 7:8 is found in several manuscripts, and omitted only by Sinaiticus among major manuscripts.

⁴⁷Once again the enumeration is not exact between the Mickelsens and Payne: The Mickelsens say that four examples have the head-tail metaphor, but do not list them. Payne specifies these three texts in his response, and I have used his number here.

⁴⁸A. and B. Mickelsen, “What Does Kephalē Mean?” 103.

⁴⁹Payne, “Response,” 123, n. 35.

⁵⁰See note 29 above, with reference to my inclusion of Deut 28:13, 44; Jer 31:7 (LXX 38:7).

⁵¹In addition to the three verses listed in the previous footnote, the articles by Payne and the Mickelsens have persuaded me to look again at Lam 1:5 (“her foes have become the head; her enemies prosper”), and to count this as a legitimate instance of κεφαλή meaning “leader” or “authority over.” These four examples, together with the deletion of the one I had erroneously counted (see above, pp. 34-35, for discussion), bring my total to sixteen in the Septuagint rather than the thirteen I had previously listed.

(2) Deut 28:44: ["If you do not obey the voice of the Lord your God . . .," v. 15] "The sojourner who is among you shall mount above you higher and higher; and you shall come down lower and lower. He shall lend to you, and you shall not lend to him; he shall be the *head*, and you shall be the tail. All these curses shall come upon you. . . ."

(3) Judg 10:18 (A): "And the people, the leaders of Gilead, said to one another, 'Who is the man that will begin to fight against the Ammonites? He shall be *head* over all the inhabitants of Gilead.'"

(4) Judg 11:8 (A): "And the elders of Gilead said to Jephthah, 'That is why we have turned to you now, that you may go with us and fight with the Ammonites, and be our *head* over all the inhabitants of Gilead.'"

(5) Judg 11:9 (A): "Jephthah said to the elders of Gilead, 'If you bring me home again to fight with the Ammonites, and the Lord gives them over to me, I will be your *head*.'"

(6) Judg 11:11: "So Jephthah went with the elders of Gilead, and all the people made him *head* and leader over them."

(7) 2 Kgdms (2 Sam) 22:44: David says to God, "You shall keep me as the *head* of the Gentiles: a people which I knew not served me."

(8) 3 Kgdms (1 Kgs) 8:1 (A): "Then Solomon assembled the elders of Israel with all the *heads* of the tribes."⁵²

(9) Ps 17(18):43: David says to God, "You will make me *head* of the Gentiles: a people whom I knew not served me."

(10) Lam 1:5: [of Jerusalem] "Her foes have become the *head*, her enemies prosper, because the Lord has made her suffer for the multitude of her transgressions; her children have gone away, captives before the foe."

(11-12) Isa 7:8: "For the *head* of Syria is Damascus, and the *head* of Damascus is Rezin" (in both cases "head" means "ruler" here: Damascus is the city which rules over Syria, and Rezin is the king who rules over Damascus).

(13-14) Isa 7:9: "And the *head* of Ephraim is Samaria, and the *head* of Samaria is the son of Remaliah."

(15) Isa 9:14-16: (In the context of judgment) "So the Lord cut off from Israel *head* and tail . . . the elder and honored man is the head,⁵³ and the prophet who teaches lies is the tail; for those who lead this people lead them astray." Here the leaders of the people are called "head."

⁵²Payne ("Response," p. 123) disagrees with the sense "authority over" in this text because he says the translators replaced the idea of "leader" "with 'heads [meaning tops] of the staffs' they carried." I discussed this interpretation on p. 29, above, in response to Richard Cervin.

⁵³In this second occurrence of "head" in this verse the LXX has ἀρχή (here in the sense of leader, ruler), not κεφαλή.

(16) Jer 31:7 (LXX 38:7): "Rejoice and exult over the *head* of the nations."⁵⁴

(5) We should also note in this regard what it actually means to have sixteen (or even eight) instances of a term used in a certain sense in the Septuagint: It is really a rich abundance of examples. Many times in NT exegesis if a scholar can find two or three clear parallel uses in the Septuagint, he or she is very satisfied. That means that we can assume that first century Jews could read and understand the particular term in that sense. Let me give a contemporary example: Imagine that I turn to a concordance of the RSV and I see that there is only one occurrence of a certain English word, such as "aunt." Do I conclude, "Twentieth century readers don't know what 'aunt' means, and we can be especially certain of this since 'aunt' occurs only in an obscure portion of Scripture (Lev 18:14), a passage that people today seldom read"? Should I conclude that people speaking English today do not know the meaning of "aunt"?

Certainly this would not be legitimate. Rather, I would conclude that the translators of the RSV assumed that "aunt" was a good, understandable English word. They put it in *expecting* readers to understand it. The fact that they used it meant that they thought it was a commonly understood term.

Now the same principle is true with the Septuagint. If I find even two or three clear instances of a word used in a certain sense, I can rightly conclude that readers in the first century AD could have understood the word in that sense. The translators wrote expecting that the readers would understand. But in the case of κεφαλή meaning "authority over, ruler," we have not two or three examples, but sixteen (or at least eight, even by the minimal count of the Mickelsens, or nine, according to Payne). That is really an abundance of evidence for κεφαλή meaning "leader" or "authority over."

In conclusion, to those who say, "Only eight examples in the Septuagint," I think it fair to respond, "A very significant eight examples, and more accurately sixteen, and compared to no examples for 'source,' they look very convincing."

b. Other Meanings for κεφαλή Claimed by the Mickelsens

After rejecting the meaning "authority over, leader" for κεφαλή, primarily on the basis of its Septuagint usage and the absence of this meaning from the Liddell-Scott lexicon,⁵⁵ the Mickelsens provide other meanings for the term κεφαλή.

⁵⁴Fitzmyer says of this passage, "The notion of supremacy or authority is surely present, and expressed by *kephalē* ("Another Look," 508).

⁵⁵I discuss the absence of the meaning "leader, authority over" from the Liddell-Scott lexicon in the next section of this article.

In 1 Cor 11:3, they say κεφαλή means "source, base or derivation."⁵⁶ Now I recognize that one lexicon gives the meaning "source" for κεφαλή.⁵⁷ But when the Mickelsens affirm that "base" and "derivation" are possible translations of κεφαλή they are claiming senses that no lexicon has ever proposed, and they are doing it with no examples of κεφαλή meaning these things in any other literature either. Where do they get these meanings?

In Eph 5:23, where it says that the husband is the *head* of the wife, they say that "head" means "one who brings to completion" (p. 108). They explain, "the husband is to give himself up to enable (bring to completion) all that his wife is meant to be" (p. 110).

Then with respect to Col 1:18, where it says that "Christ is the head of the body, the church," the Mickelsens say that "head" means "exalted originator and completer" (p. 108). We should note that the Mickelsens call these "ordinary Greek meanings" (p. 105) for κεφαλή, and tell us that these are "Greek meanings that would have been familiar to the first readers" (p. 110). But the fact is that a number of these "ordinary and familiar" Greek meanings have never been seen in any lexicon, or claimed in any writing on the meaning of κεφαλή before this work of the Mickelsens' in 1986. The meaning "exalted originator and completer" is in no lexicon. The meaning "one who brings to completion" is in no lexicon. The meaning "base, derivation" is in no lexicon.

But if this is so, then what convincing examples from Greek literature do the Mickelsens give to show these to be "familiar" and "ordinary" meanings? They give none. Then what authorities do they quote to support these new meanings? They quote none. In short, they have given no evidence to support their assertions that these are ordinary meanings. It would not seem wise to accept these meanings as legitimate senses for κεφαλή.

In fact, this attempt to give some alternative sense to κεφαλή in NT contexts where the meaning "authority over" seems so clearly evident from the contexts is one more example of a disturbing tendency among evangelical feminist scholars today, a tendency to search for "any meaning but authority" for the word κεφαλή in the NT. Even in Col 2:10 (where Christ is called "the *head* of all rule and authority"), and in Eph 1:20-24 (where God has exalted Christ "far above all rule and authority and power and dominion" and "has put all things under his feet and has made him the *head* over all things for the church"), the Mickelsens still are unable to admit the meaning "authority over," but say that head here means rather "top or crown (extremity)" (p. 106). When this can happen even in texts where authority is so clearly specified in context, one wonders if it is a prior doctrinal conviction rather than sound linguistic analysis that has led to their conclusions in these texts.

⁵⁶p. 107.

⁵⁷I discussed the legitimacy of using Liddell-Scott's definition of "source" above, pp. 14-16.

c. *The argument from the Liddell-Scott lexicon*

Although all the lexicons that specialize in the NT period list “ruler, leader, or authority over” as a meaning for κεφαλή at the time of the NT,⁵⁸ the Mickelsens and others have placed much emphasis on the fact that the Liddell-Scott lexicon does not include this meaning. What is the significance of this? First, our earlier survey showed that the meaning “authority over” was not very common — indeed, is hardly found at all — before the time of the Septuagint, about the second century BC. Nonetheless, the evidence we have cited above showing around forty examples of this meaning indicates that the omission from LSJ must have been an oversight which we hope will be corrected in a subsequent edition.⁵⁹ In fact, Joseph Fitzmyer recently wrote, “The next edition of the *Greek-English-Lexicon* of Liddell-Scott-Jones will have to provide a sub-category within the metaphorical uses of κεφαλή in the sense of ‘leader, ruler.’ ”⁶⁰

Second, we should note that LSJ does list under the adjective κεφάλαιος (“head like”) the following meanings: “metaphorical, of persons, *the head or chief*” (pp. 944-45). LSJ then lists eight examples of this sense. Similarly, the word κεφαλουργός (literally, “head of work”) has the meaning “foreman of works” (p. 945). Therefore, the meaning “authority over” for κεφαλή itself would probably have been understandable even if not commonly used in earlier periods well before the time of the NT.

This suggests a possible reason why the noun κεφαλή itself was not found in the earlier history of the language with the meaning “authority, ruler.” Perhaps because the adjective κεφάλαιος or this adjective used as a substantive could function with the meaning “chief, ruler” in an earlier period, there may have been no need for the noun κεφαλή to take a similar meaning. Yet later in the development of the language the noun κεφαλή also came to take this sense.

⁵⁸My earlier article (pp. 47-48) cites definitions from BAGD, Thayer, Cremer, NIDNTT, and (for the Septuagint) TDNT. See also n. 72 below.

⁵⁹Richard Cervin is hardly correct when he says “the contributors and editors of LSJ included a team of theologians, Milligan among them” (p. 86). In fact, the Preface to LSJ mentions no “team of theologians” but simply says that the results of the study of the meanings of words in the NT are “readily accessible,” and mentions some lexicons that are “generally sufficient” (p. ix). H. Stuart Jones, the editor of the most recent edition of LSJ, mentions only that Professor Milligan sent him some advance proofs of his specialty lexicon of the papyri as they illustrate NT usage. Jones also mentions A. H. McNeil and A. Llewellyn Davies regarding their advice on the Septuagint and the Hexapla, but the preface mentions nothing else concerning any “team of theologians.”

⁶⁰Fitzmyer, “Another look,” 511.

2. (1986) Ruth A. Tucker, "Response"

In this article Ruth Tucker finds examples of κεφαλή meaning "authority over" in Clement of Alexandria (ca. AD 155-220), Tertullian (ca. AD 169-215), Cyprian (ca. AD 200-55), and other early writers.

Tucker says,

In conclusion, it is my impression that whatever the word *kephalē* meant to the apostle Paul as he wrote 1 Corinthians 11 and Ephesians 5, it was generally interpreted by the church fathers and by Calvin to mean authority, superior rank, or pre-eminence. These findings bring into question some of the Mickelsens' assumptions — particularly that the "superior rank" meaning of *kephalē* is not "one of the ordinary Greek meanings" but rather a "meaning associated with the English word *head*." More research needs to be done in this area, but it seems clear that the fathers used this so-called English meaning long before they could have in any way been influenced by the English language. (p. 117)

We can only note here that Tucker's survey of writings that followed the NT period gives some support to the idea that the meaning "authority over" was a recognized meaning at the time of the NT as well.

3. (1986) Philip B. Payne, "Response"

In this response to the Mickelsens' article Philip Payne repeats "the Septuagint argument" concerning the infrequent use of κεφαλή to translate the Hebrew term מֶלֶךְ when it meant "leader, ruler." I have discussed that argument at length in the previous analysis of the Mickelsens' article.

Payne also adds some examples where he claims that κεφαλή means "source of life."

a. Philo

The first example comes from Philo, *The Preliminary Studies* 61:

And Esau is the progenitor (ὁ γενάρχης) of all the clan here described, the head as of a living animal (κεφαλή δὲ ὡς ζώου)

The sense of "head" here is difficult to determine. Payne suggests the meaning "source of life" for head, a specific kind of "source" that has never before been given in any lexicon. Yet it is possible that Philo thought of the physical head of an animal as in some sense energizing or giving life to the animal — this would then be a simile in which Esau (a representative of stubborn disobe-

dience in this context) gives life to a whole list of other sins that Philo has been describing as a “family” in this allegory. On the other hand, the word translated above as “progenitor” (γενάρχης) also can mean “ruler of created beings” (LSJ, 342). In that case the text would read:

And Esau is the ruler of all the clan here described, the head as of a living animal.

Here the meaning would be that Esau is the ruler over the rest of the sinful clan and head would mean “ruler, authority over.” It seems impossible from the context that we have to decide clearly for one meaning or the other in this text.

The next text cited by Payne is Philo, *On Rewards and Punishments* 125. This was discussed above in the response to Richard Cervin’s article.⁶¹ In this quotation the sense “source of life” must also be seen as a possible meaning, but the sense “ruler, authority over” is also quite possible, and, as we argued above, in the context of commenting on God’s promise to make the people the “head and not the tail” so that they would rule over other nations, the meaning “ruler, authority over” seems more likely.

b. Artemidorus

Next, Payne cites some texts from Artemidorus Daldiani (late second century AD), in his work *Oneirocritica* (or *The Interpretation of Dreams*). Payne gives the following citations:

Another man dreamt that he was beheaded. In real life, the father of this man, too, died; for as the head [*kephalē*] is the source of life and light for the whole body, he was responsible for the dreamer’s life and light. . . . The head [*kephalē*] indicates one’s father. (1.2)

The head [*kephalē*] resembles parents in that it is the cause [*aitia*] of one’s living. (1.35).

The head [*kephalē*] signifies the father of the dreamer. . . . Whenever, then a poor man that has a rich father dreams that his own head has been removed by a lion and that he dies as a result, it is probable that his father will die . . . For the head [*kephalē*] represents the father; the removal of the head [*kephalē*], the death of the father. (3.66)

Do these examples show that κεφαλή could be used metaphorically to mean “source”? If we give a fuller context than Payne provided in his article, we can see that it does not provide an example of “head” meaning “source” for no person is in these texts called “head.” But what the text does show is that Artemidorus pointed out various *functions* of the head in a human body and then said

⁶¹See pp. 30-32 above.

that these functions signified something in interpreting dreams (the whole text is an explanation of how to interpret dreams).

In the following context we see that Artemidorus gives *many* different interpretations to the dream of being beheaded, but in none of them would we say that this text adds new meanings to the word "head" itself:

If a man dreams that he has been beheaded . . . it is inauspicious both for a man with parents and a man with children. For the head resembles parents in that it is the cause of one's living. It is like *children* because of the face and because of the resemblance. . . . Also, a man who owned a *house* has lost it. For the head is as it were the house of the senses. . . .

To bankers, usurers, men who have to collect subscriptions, shipmasters, merchants, and all who collect money, it signifies loss of *capital* because the word for "capital" is derived from the word for "head." . . . To a slave who enjoys the confidence of his master, it signifies that he will lose that confidence. . . . But to other slaves, the dream signifies freedom. For the head is the *master of the body*, and when it is cut off, it signifies that the slave is separated from his master and will be free. . . .

If someone who is at sea sees this dream, it signifies that the *sail-yard* of the ship will be lost, unless it is one of the sailors who has seen it. For, in these cases, I have observed that it signifies death to their *superiors*. For the boatswain is the *superior* of the ordinary sailor; the officer in command of the bow is the boatswain's *superior*; the steersman is the *superior* of the officer who commands the bow; and the shipmaster is the *superior* of the steersman. . . .

To have two or three heads is auspicious for an athlete. For he will be crowned in as many contests. (1. 35)⁶²

This larger context shows us that in all of these examples the word κεφαλή simply *means* the *physical head* of a person's body. When Artemidorus speaks of losing one's head or having three heads in a dream, he is simply speaking of a physical head. When he says that the head *signifies* something in the dream, he is still speaking of the physical head and then giving a symbolic interpretation to it.

It would certainly be illegitimate to take this text and make a list of many new "meanings" that the word κεφαλή could take in Ancient Greek. We could not take that text, for example, and say that "head" now also means (1) "house," because Artemidorus says that the head is the "house of the senses"; (2) "monetary capital," because Artemidorus says that the loss of the head "signifies loss of capital"; (3) "master of a slave," for Artemidorus says that "the head is the master of the body"; (4) "sailyard of a ship"; (5)

⁶²This translation is quoted from Artemidorus Daldianus, *The Interpretation of Dreams* (= *Oneirocritica*), translated by Robert J. White (Park Ridge, N.J.: Nooyes, 1975) 34-35; the Greek text is found in *Artemidori Daldiani Onirocriticon Libre V*, edited by Robert A. Pack (Leipzig: Teubner, 1963) 43-45.

"superior naval officer"; and (6) "athletic contest." All of these are simply symbolic interpretations which Artemidorus has given and do not constitute new metaphorical meanings for κεφαλή.⁶³

However, one further observation must be made from this text. Because Artemidorus, in speaking about the physical head of a human body, says that "the head resembles parents in that it is the cause (Greek αἰτία) of one's living" (literally, of life, τοῦ ζῆν), we must recognize that there was an awareness that the physical head was in some sense the cause (or one might say "source") of life. Perhaps this is just a common sense observation of the fact that people who are beheaded do not continue to live! But it may also reflect a more complex understanding of the mental faculties located in the head — Artemidorus does say that the head is "the house of the senses." In this case it would be similar to the Philo quotations mentioned above where Philo apparently thought of the head as giving energy and direction to the body.

Whether the fact that (1) some in the ancient world thought of the *physical* head as somehow the "source" of energy and life for the body would have led to (2) a *metaphorical* use of "head" actually to *mean* "source," we cannot say without some clear examples demonstrating such a use. It is very similar to the case of the quotations mentioned earlier from Plato, Philo, and Plutarch, in which the head was said to be the "ruler" of all the parts within us. These quotations showed that a *metaphorical* use of κεφαλή to *mean* "ruler" would have been possible and probably understandable in the ancient world, but it did not mean that that metaphori-

⁶³Although Payne uses incorrect reasoning to derive the meaning "source" from these uses in Artemidorus, it is additionally disappointing to see that he quoted this very obscure text (accessible only at highly specialized libraries) to show instances where Artemidorus said that the head symbolized the "source" of something but did not inform the reader that in the very same section he quoted (*Oneirocritica* 1.35) Artemidorus also said that the head symbolized the "superior" of a sailor and the "master" of a slave, and that the head was the "master of the body" — all meanings that Payne denies.

Moreover, in order to support his contention that "the ancient Greek world through the time of Paul commonly believed that the heart, not the head, was the center of emotions and spirit, the 'central governing place of the body,'" (pp. 119-120), Payne cites only one ancient author, Aristotle, and then cites the *Oxford Classical Dictionary* article on "Anatomy and Physiology" as saying about Aristotle that, "having found the brain to be devoid of sensation, he concluded that it could not be associated with it. The function of the brain was to keep the heart from overheating the blood" (Payne, p. 120, n. 26, citing *OCD*, 59). What Payne does not tell the reader is that the immediately preceding two sentences in the *OCD* article say that this view of Aristotle's was *contrary* to the commonly held view in the ancient world: "Among the noteworthy errors of Aristotle is his refusal to attach importance to the brain. Intelligence he placed in the heart. *This was contrary to the views of some of his medical contemporaries, contrary to the popular view, and contrary to the doctrine of the Timaeus*" (*OCD*, 59, italics mine).

So in the use of both Artemidorus and the *OCD* Payne has given misleading and selective quotations, and has done so from technical works that will not be checked by even one in a thousand readers of such a widely-circulated and popularly written book.

cal use *actually occurred*. In order to demonstrate that we needed to look at the thirty or forty texts where someone was actually called the "head" of something (such as the Roman empire, the church, the nation of Israel, etc.). In this case however, no metaphorical uses of κεφαλή in the sense of "source" have been found in the Artemidorus quotations.⁶⁴ In conclusion, κεφαλή in all these Artemidorus texts simply means "physical head" of the human body.

c. Orphic Fragments 21a

As an additional example of κεφαλή meaning "source," Payne also cites *Orphic Fragments 21a*, "Zeus is the head, Zeus the middle, and from Zeus all things are completed." But Cervin's analysis of this text is quite valid: he says, "This entire fragment is ambiguous" (p. 90).⁶⁵

d. 1 Cor 11:3

In 1 Cor 11:3 Paul says,

I want you to understand that the *head* of every man is Christ, the *head* of a woman is the man, and the head of Christ is God.

Payne objects to the sense "authority over" in this text because he thinks that it would imply a theological error: He says,

Under the interpretation that "head" means "authority" the present tense of *estin* requires that Christ now in the present time after his resurrection and ascension is under the authority of God. Such a view has been condemned throughout most of church history as subordinationist Christology. (pp. 126-27)

But Payne here has simply misunderstood the doctrine of the Trinity as it has been held throughout the church from at least the time of the Nicene Creed in AD 325. From that time the doctrine of the "eternal generation of the Son" has been taken to imply a *relationship* between the Father and the Son that *eternally* existed

⁶⁴Cotterell and Turner (*Linguistics and Biblical Interpretation*, 144) concur with this analysis:

Least helpful of the types of evidence advanced, is the claim that amongst the ancients the head was often regarded as the source of a variety of substances and influences pertinent to life. The claim itself need not be doubted, but how is it *relevant*? Just because, say, Artemidorus . . . maintains that "the head is the source of light and life for the body" does not mean that the writer considered "source" to be a *sense* of the word "head." Our employers are the source of our income, books are the source of our knowledge, and the good, well-watered land the source of our food, but no one in their right mind would suggest that "source" is a *sense* of the words "employer," "books," or "land." Such would be a classic case of the confusion between the sense of a word and (adjunct) properties of the thing-in-the-world the word denotes.

⁶⁵See discussion above, p. 16.

and that will always exist — a relationship that includes a subordination in role, but not in essence or being. Certainly Scripture speaks of that when it says, for example, that when Christ “had made purification for sins, he sat down at the right hand of the Majesty on high” (Heb 1:3). Jesus is at the right hand, but God the Father is still on the throne.

So Charles Hodge can say,

The Nicene doctrine includes, — 1. The principle of the subordination of the Son to the Father, and of the Spirit to the Father and the Son. But this subordination does not imply inferiority. . . . The subordination intended is only that which concerns the mode of subsistence and operation. . . .

The creeds are nothing more than a well-ordered arrangement of the facts of Scripture which concern the doctrine of the Trinity. They assert the distinct personality of the Father, Son, and Spirit . . . and their consequent perfect equality; and the subordination of the Son to the Father, and of the Spirit to the Father and the Son, as to the mode of subsistence and operation. These are Scriptural facts, to which the creeds in question add nothing; and it is in this sense they have been accepted by the Church universal.⁶⁶

Similarly, A. H. Strong says,

Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, while equal in essence and dignity, stand to each other in an order of personality, office, and operation.

...

The subordination of the *person* of the Son to the *person* of the Father, or in other words an order of personality, office, and operation which permits the Father to be officially first, the Son second, and the Spirit third, is perfectly consistent with equality. Priority is not necessarily superiority. . . .

We frankly recognize an eternal subordination of Christ to the Father, but we maintain at the same time that this subordination is a subordination of order, office, and operation, not a subordination of essence.⁶⁷

Payne has simply misunderstood the term “subordinationist Christology.” This term has generally meant not the orthodox view that there is subordination in role in the Trinity, but rather the heretical view found, for example, in Arianism, in which a subordinate *essence or being* of the Son was advocated, so that Christ could not be said to be “of the same essence” (*homoousios*) as the Father. The orthodox doctrine has always been that there is *equality in essence and subordination in role*, and that these two are consistent with each other. Certainly that is a view consistent with Paul’s statement in 1 Cor 11:3 that “the head of Christ is God,” thus

⁶⁶*Systematic Theology* (3 vols.; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1970 [reprint]) 1:460-2 (italics mine).

⁶⁷*Systematic Theology* (Valley Forge, Pa.: Judson, 1907) 342.

indicating a distinction in role in which primary authority and leadership among the persons of the Trinity has always been and will always be the possession of God the Father.⁶⁸

4. (1986) Walter L. Liefeld, "Women, Submission, and Ministry in 1 Corinthians"

In this essay Dr. Liefeld comments on the dispute over the meaning of κεφαλή.

The meaning "source," adduced by Bedale as a clue to some of Paul's passages, lacks clear evidence. . . . In my judgment, however, it is no longer possible, given Grudem's research, to dismiss the idea of "rulership" from the discussion (p. 139).

I would of course concur with Dr. Liefeld at this point. However, Liefeld then goes on to suggest a different sense for κεφαλή, "prominent part," or "prominent or honored member" (pp. 139-40).

This is similar to the suggestion made by Richard Cervin and discussed above.⁶⁹ Once again it must be said that a number of texts

⁶⁸It is troubling therefore to find the evangelical feminists Richard and Katherine Kroeger writing the article "Subordinationism" in the *Evangelical Dictionary of Theology* (ed. Walter Elwell; Grand Rapids: Baker, 1984), and asserting in the first sentence that subordinationism is "a doctrine that assigns an inferiority of being, status, or role to the Son or the Holy Spirit within the Trinity. Condemned by numerous church councils, this doctrine has continued in one form or another throughout the history of the church" (p. 1058, emphasis mine). When the Kroegers add the phrase "or role" to their definition they condemn all orthodox Christology from the Nicene Creed onward and thereby condemn a teaching that Charles Hodge says has been a teaching of "the Church universal."

A similar misunderstanding is found in Gretchen Hull, *Equal to Serve* (Old Tappan, N.J.: Revell, 1987), who says, "If we define *head* as 'authority over,' then 1 Corinthians 11:3 can mean that there is a dominant to subordinate hierarchy within the Trinity, a position that does violence to the equality of the Persons of the Godhead. Early in its history, orthodox Christianity took a firm stand against any teaching that would make Christ a subordinate figure. To say that God is somehow authoritative over Christ erodes the Savior's full divinity and puts a Christian on dangerous theological ground" (pp. 193-94). And Katherine Kroeger says in her appendix to this same book, "The heretics would argue that although the Son is of the same substance as the Father, He is under subjection" (283). But these statements by Hull and Kroeger are simply false. (A strong warning against this theological tendency of evangelical feminism is seen in Robert Letham's recent article, "The Man-Woman Debate: Theological Comment," *WTJ* 52 [Spring, 1990] 65-78.)

Such an attempt to shift the understanding of the doctrine of the Trinity as it has been held through the history of the church does not appear to be accidental, however, for the fact that God the Son can be eternally equal to God the Father in deity and in essence, but subordinate to the Father in authority, cuts at the heart of the feminist claim that a subordinate role necessarily implies lesser importance or lesser personhood. (Surprisingly, Millard Erickson [*Concise Dictionary of Christian Theology* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1986) 161; similarly his *Christian Theology* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1983-85) 338, 698] expresses a position similar to the Kroegers here, seeing subordination in role as non-eternal, but rather a temporary activity of members of the Trinity for a period of ministry.)

⁶⁹Pp. 37-39.

might be found in which κεφαλή speaks of a kind of prominence derived from ruling authority or power that is possessed by (for example) the king of a nation or the head of a tribe, or from Christ's position as the head of the church. But it does not seem possible to demonstrate a sense of "honored part" or "prominent part" apart from a nuance of ruling authority as well.

Second, it must be said that this suggestion has previously been mentioned in no lexicons (to my knowledge) and thus one wonders why it is necessary when the sense "leader, authority over" will fit as well or better.

Third, it is doubtful that the sense "prominent part" really fits the context of texts like 1 Cor 11:3: if Paul had meant to imply the idea of prominence in this text then, instead of saying "the head of the woman is the man," he would have had to say, "the head of the *family* is the husband," and instead of saying "the head of every man is Christ," he would have had to say, "the head of *mankind* is Christ." Instead of saying, "the head of Christ is God," he would have had to say, "the head of the *Godhead* is the Father." But he did not say these things, in which he could have mentioned the prominent or most honored member of a larger group. Rather he mentioned two individuals in each set of relationships, thus giving a sense which much more readily allows the meaning "authority over" than "prominent part."

5. Gilbert Bilezikian, "A Critical Examination of Wayne Grudem's treatment of *kephalē* in Ancient Greek Texts"

Dr. Bilezikian has given some criticisms of my earlier article which I accept as valid and which are similar to those mentioned by Richard Cervin in the article discussed above.⁷⁰ Among the valid criticisms which I accept from Dr. Bilezikian are the following: (1) The need for a separate category, "ruling part," to distinguish five examples where the physical head of a person is said to rule over the human body (p. 220); (2) The need to delete two examples from my list of forty-nine because I had miscounted them in my final enumeration.⁷¹

However, I find that I must differ with Bilezikian's critique at several other points.

a. Lexicons

Bilezikian suggests that some lexicons list the meaning "source" and others list the meaning "ruler, authority over," and it is just a question of which lexicon one chooses to use. He says,

⁷⁰Although Dr. Bilezikian wrote these criticisms before Mr. Cervin's article, they apparently came up with the criticisms independently, because Mr. Cervin does not indicate that he has seen Dr. Bilezikian's article.

⁷¹See above, pp. 34-35.

This lack of lexical agreement on the meaning of *kephalē* is partly responsible for the frustration of scholars who have been attempting, in recent years, to understand the meaning of male/female relations in the Pauline epistles. Each one here is aware of the battle of the lexicons that has been waged by Bible scholars who have written on this issue during the last two decades. . . . They have been flinging their favorite lexicons back and forth at each other's heads (pp. 218-19).

However, what Bilezikian fails to make clear is that, although one lexicon (Liddell-Scott) does list "source, origin" as a sense when *κεφαλή* is applied to the *endpoint* of something like a river or a span of time, nevertheless, *no lexicon has ever yet listed "source" as a metaphorical meaning for κεφαλή when applied to persons.* By contrast, *all the major lexicons for the NT period list a meaning such as "authority over" or "ruler, leader" as a meaning for κεφαλή.*⁷² It is simply misleading to talk about a "battle of the lexicons."

b. Individual texts

In the examination of the individual texts where I found the sense "authority over," Bilezikian differs from Cervin in that he finds the meaning "source" in almost every text in which I saw the meaning "ruler" or "authority over." We do not need to examine every one of those quotations again, but a few instances will give the direction of Bilezikian's argument.

(1) Herodotus 7.148: The Delphic oracle warns the Argives to protect those with full citizenship from attack and thus the remainder of the population will be protected, saying, "guarding your *head* from the blow and the *head* shall shelter the body."⁷³

Here Bilezikian says, "The notion of an authority function is completely absent. . . . This text describes headship not as 'authority over' but as a source of protection . . . which item . . . should be classified as 'Source, origin' " (p. 221).

But here we can try substituting "leaders" and "source" to see which makes better sense:

⁷²My earlier article (pp. 47-48) cites definitions from BAGD, Thayer, Cremer, NIDNTT, and (for the Septuagint) TDNT. Since then two more lexicons have been published: the sixth edition of Walter Bauer's *Griechisch-deutsches Wörterbuch* (ed. Kurt and Barbara Aland; Berlin: Walter DeGruyter, 1988) 874-75, lists no such meaning as "source" but does give the meaning "Oberhaupt," ("chief, leader") (875). And the new *Greek English Lexicon of the NT Based on Semantic Domains* (2 vols.; ed. Johannes Louw and Eugene E. Nida; New York: United Bible Societies, 1988), lists for *κεφαλή* the meaning, "one who is of supreme or preeminent status, in view of authority to order or command—'one who is the head of, one who is superior to, one who is supreme over'" (1:739), but they give no meaning such as "source, origin." In light of such unanimity of testimony to one meaning and absence of testimony to another, it is difficult for me to understand how Dr. Bilezikian can speak of a "lack of lexical agreement on the meaning of *kephalē*" (218).

⁷³See discussion above, pp. 26-27.

My suggestion: "guarding your *leaders* from the blow; and the *leaders* shall shelter the body."

Bilezikian's suggestion: "guarding your *source* from the blow; and the *source* shall shelter the body."

The first alternative is preferable because the idea of guarding "leaders" is an understandable one for a population. To tell a population to guard its "source" would make no sense, for they would not know what was being referred to.

Now Bilezikian could respond at this point that he was not arguing for the meaning "source" in this text, but the meaning "source of protection." But this illustrates a fundamental error in his argument: in order to make any of his explanations work, he must assume that κεφαλή means not just "source" but "source of something," and he then varies the "something" from text to text so that he actually gives κεφαλή many new senses (source of protection, source of vitality, source of well-being, etc.). But this is not sound analysis: κεφαλή does not take all these new specialized meanings, never before found in any lexicon, attested only in one text, and discovered only now for the first time by Bilezikian. In actuality, the fact that he must supply "source of something" and make the "something" different each time shows even more clearly that "source" alone is not a legitimate meaning for κεφαλή.

A few more examples will illustrate this point, and in each one when we try substituting the simple meaning "source" it will be evident how this meaning is unacceptable:

(23) Plutarch, *Pelopidas* 2.1.3: in an army, "the light-armed troops are like the hands, the calvary like the feet, the line of men-at-arms itself like chest and breastplate, and the general is like the *head*."

Bilezikian says, "The general's function as the 'head' of the troops is explained as the general's being the source of their safety, the cause of their continued existence. . . . This instance of *kephalē* should be tabulated under 'Source, origin.'" (pp. 226-27)

Bilezikian treats a number of examples in this same way: he looks around in the context until he can find something that the person called "head" is the "source" of, whether leadership or protection or financial support, etc. This is not hard to do because in the nature of things in this world, *everything* is the "source" of something else — the ground is the source of food, rivers are the source of water, trees are the source of leaves, cows are the source of milk, even rocks are a source of stability and support. Conversely, to take the example above, the soldiers are also a "source" of strength and support for the general. But that does not mean that "hand" or "foot" or "chest" can all mean "source."

Some other examples show the same procedure:

(26) Plutarch, *Galba*, 4. 3: "Vindex . . . wrote to Galba inviting him to assume the imperial power, and thus to serve what was a vigorous body in need of a head."

Although this was an invitation to Galba to become emperor of Rome, Bilezikian says, "They needed an emperor in Rome who would 'serve' them as the head 'serves a vigorous body.' . . . Headship is viewed in this text as a source of increased vitality. . . . This instance of *kephalē* is to be listed under 'Source, origin'" (pp. 228-29).

In this quotation the "body" in question is the Gallic provinces. Once again we can substitute terms to see which is the most likely meaning.

My suggestion: To assume the imperial power, and thus to serve what was a vigorous province in need of a *leader*.

Bilezikian's suggestion: To assume the imperial power, and thus to serve what was a vigorous province in need of a *source*.

Once again, the meaning "leader" makes sense in the context, for it was leadership that this section of the empire needed. But the meaning "source" would have made no sense — who would have said that a province that already existed needed a "source"?

(30) Hermas, *Similitudes* 7.3: The man is told that his family "cannot be punished in any way other than if you, the *head* of the house be afflicted."

Bilezikian objects that the next sentence should be added to the quotation. It says, "For when you are afflicted, they also will necessarily be afflicted, but while you prosper, they cannot suffer any affliction!" He then says, "The full quote defines the role of the *head* in regard to the family as 'provider,' the source of its well-being. . . . This instance belongs in Grudem's category 3, 'Source, origin'" (pp. 230-31).

Again we can substitute terms to see which is a more convincing translation:

My suggestion: The family "cannot be punished in any other way than if you, the *leader* of the house be afflicted."

Bilezikian's suggestion: The family "cannot be punished in any other way than if you, the *source* of the house be afflicted."

Again the idea of leader of a family would be quite understandable. But the idea that the father is the "source" of the family would make no sense with respect to the wife (or any possible servants) in the household, for the father was certainly not the source of them.

Bilezikian's error is simply this: whenever something *functions* as a "source," he says that the *name* of that thing can actually

mean source. But on this account almost *any* word could mean "source." And in fact almost any word could mean anything else as well. Using this procedure, we could easily make κεφαλή mean just the *opposite* of "source" — we could make it mean, for example, "recipient": Since the general is the "recipient" of support from the army, we could say that κεφαλή means "recipient" in that text. Since the Roman emperor is the "recipient" of support and taxes from the provinces, we could say that κεφαλή means "recipient" here also, etc.

The fact that Bilezikian's procedure could lead to almost any noun meaning "source," and the fact that it can also make a noun mean just the opposite of "source," should warn us against the error of such a procedure — it has no controls, and no basis in sound linguistic analysis.

It is proper rather to ask exactly which characteristics of a physical head were recognized in the ancient world and were evident in contexts where people were metaphorically called "head." If those characteristics occur again and again in related contexts, then we can be reasonably certain that those characteristics were the ones intended by the metaphorical use of "head." In fact this is what we find. It is consistently people in leadership or authority who are referred to as "head." The examples cited above show that not only the general of an army, but also the Roman emperor, the head of a household, the heads of the tribes of Israel, David as king of Israel, and Christ as the head of the church, are all referred to metaphorically by κεφαλή. What they share is a function of rule or authority. Moreover, there are several texts that say explicitly that the head is the "ruling" part of the body.⁷⁴

By contrast, where there are persons whose distinctive function is to be the source of something else, but where no leadership function attaches to them, the word κεφαλή is never used. Bilezikian recognizes this and finds it surprising:

There exists no known instance of *kephalē* used figuratively in reference to women. This is especially surprising since the meaning of *kephalē* as source of life and servant provider would have particularly suitable to describe roles assigned to women in antiquity. (p. 235)

He goes on to explain this absence of any examples by the fact that κεφαλή was not frequently used in a metaphorical sense and the fact that women were not often referred to in Greek literature (pp. 235-36), but such an explanation is hardly sufficient: when we have over forty examples referring to persons in leadership as "head" of something it shows that the metaphorical use of κεφαλή was not extremely rare. And to say that Greek literature does not talk much

⁷⁴See above the quotations from Plato, Philo, and Plutarch, quotations (3), (18), (19), (20), (28), and (29), pp. 27-28.

about women (especially in the role of mother and provider) is simply not true. What this statement of Bilezikian's actually indicates is that there are no clear examples to support his sought-after meaning "source." But when no clear evidence turns up to support one's hypothesis, it would seem better to abandon the hypothesis than to stick with it and give unsubstantiated reasons why the expected data have not been forthcoming. At least we should realize that we are being asked to accept a meaning for κεφαλή for which no unambiguous supporting evidence has yet been provided.

Bilezikian's opposition to the idea of "authority" in any human relationships and in any texts that contain the word κεφαλή carries over into the NT as well. Even in the three texts where authority would quite readily be admitted by almost all commentators, Bilezikian does not acknowledge it:

(43) Eph 1:21, 22: Paul writes that God exalted Christ "far above all rule and authority and power and dominion, and above every name that is named . . . and he has put all things under his feet and has made him the *head* over all things for the church."

Here Bilezikian finds not authority but the idea of source: He says, "In His headship, Christ is the source of life and increase to the church. In this passage there is no reference to headship as assumption of authority over the church" (p. 244).

Yet the context of exaltation "above all rule and authority and power and dominion" certainly shows Christ's assumption of authority.⁷⁵

(45-46) Eph 5:23: "For the husband is the *head* of the wife as Christ is the *head* of the church, his body, and is himself its savior."

Here Bilezikian says, "As 'head' of the church, Christ is both the source of her life and her sustainer. . . . In this development on the meaning of headship, there is nothing in the text to suggest that *head* might have implications of rulership or authority" (p. 245).

Once again the context indicates something quite different: The previous verse says, "Wives be subject to your husbands, as to the Lord." And the following verse says, "As the church is *subject* to Christ, so let wives also be subject in everything to their husbands" (vv. 22-24). Although Bilezikian speaks of the idea of "mutual submission" (p. 245), he fails to deal with the fact that the verb ὑποτάσσω always has to do with *submission to authority* in the

⁷⁵Bilezikian's objection that the Greek phrase ὑπὲρ πάντα, "over all things," cannot mean "authority over all things" because ὑπὲρ means "above," not "over" (p. 244) carries little force: Whether Christ is head "over all things" or "above all things," he still has authority over all. Moreover, in the same sentence Paul says that God "has put *all things under his feet*" (Eph 1:22). Paul's use of ὑπὲρ here to say that Christ is "over all things" probably picks up on his use of the related preposition ὑπεράνω, "far above," in v. 21, where Christ is said to be "far above all rule and authority and power and dominion." It is futile for Bilezikian to try to empty Eph 1:22 of the concept of Christ's universal authority.

NT and outside of it. Husbands are not told to be subject to their wives in this context, simply wives to husbands. And Christ is never said to be subject to the church, only the church to Christ. This idea of submission to the authority of Christ on the part of the church is impossible to remove from the context, and makes it difficult to accept Bilezikian's claim that there is no suggestion of rulership or authority in the term κεφαλή in this context.

Bilezikian goes on to say that in Eph 5:23 "*head* designates the source of life ('Savior') of servanthood ('gave himself up'), and of growth ('nourishes it')" (p. 246), and says that "in their headship to their wives husbands fulfill servant roles similar to the servant ministries of Christ to the church" (p. 245).

But Bilezikian's analysis here is simply an illustration of the fact that at this key text the contrived nature of the suggested meaning "source" for "head" most clearly shows itself: How can Paul have meant that the husband is the *source* of the wife as Christ is the *source* of the church? I am certainly not the "source" of my wife! Nor is any husband today, nor was any husband in the church at Ephesus the "source" of his wife! The fact that this meaning will not fit is evident in the fact that no evangelical feminist interpreter will propose the mere meaning "source" for this text, but each one will always shift the basis of discussion by importing some different, specialized sense, such as "source of *something* (such as encouragement, comfort, growth, etc.)." But the fact that the meaning "source" itself will not fit should serve as a warning that this suggested meaning is incorrect at its foundation.

On the other hand, we should realize the importance of this text: If the husband is indeed the head of the wife as Christ is the head of the church, and if "head" carries the sense "authority over" or "leader," then the feminist claim that there should be total equality and interchangeability of roles in marriage is simply inconsistent with the NT.

(48) Col 2:10: "And you have come to fullness of life in him, who is the *head* of all rule and authority."

Once again Bilezikian predictably gets the meaning "source" out of this passage: "Christ is 'the head of all power and authority' because he is the *source* of their existence" (pp. 246-47).

But it is difficult to understand how Bilezikian can see the idea of "source" here without any connotation of authority. If (according to Bilezikian) Christ is the *source* of all other rule and authority in the universe, then is he not also a far greater authority and a far greater ruler than all of these others? Even if we were to take the meaning "source" for κεφαλή here (which is not necessary, for "ruler" or "authority over" fits much better) it would still be difficult to agree with Dr. Bilezikian's statement that "this text, like the others, is also devoid of any mention or connotation of rulership in reference to the headship of Christ" (p. 247).

In all of these individual texts, the question must be asked, is the meaning “authority, ruler” or the meaning “source” more persuasive? We must realize that Bilezikian has not given us one example of a person called κεφαλή where he claims the meaning “source” but where the person was not someone in a position of authority. Would it not be unusual — if κεφαλή indeed means source and not authority — that people who are called “head” are all rulers and leaders? We do not find that wives and mothers are called “heads.” We do not find that soldiers who are the source of strength and power for an army are called “heads.” We do not find that citizens who are the source of strength for a nation are called “heads.”

Rather, we find that the king of Egypt is a “head,” the general of an army is “head,” the Roman emperor is “head,” David the king of Israel is “head,” the leaders of the tribes of Israel are “heads,” and, in the NT, the husband is the “head” of the wife and Christ is the “head” of the church and God the Father is the “head” of Christ. No one in a non-leadership position is called “head.” Why? Perhaps because there was a sense in the ancient world that κεφαλή when used of persons meant someone in a position of rule or authority, just as the head was said by secular as well as Jewish writers to be the “ruling part” of the body.

c. 1 Cor 11:3

Bilezikian alleges, “Grudem adopts the view that this text describes a chain of command, moving from the top of a hierarchy of power to the bottom, whereby God the Father is the ‘authority over’ God the Son, Christ is the authority over every man, and man is the authority over the woman” (pp. 241-42).

This statement is simply false. I have never taught or written that there is a “chain of command” in 1 Cor 11:3, nor (to my knowledge) have other responsible advocates of a complementarian position with regard to men and women. The idea of a “chain of command” suggests that the wife can only relate to God through her husband rather than directly. But this is certainly false. Paul in 1 Cor 11:3 simply sets up three distinct relationships: the headship of God the Father in the Trinity, the headship of Christ over every man, and the headship of a man over a woman. But certainly every woman is able to relate directly to God through Christ, not simply through her husband.

d. A Fundamental Opposition to the Idea of Authority

A fundamental commitment of Bilezikian’s is evident in his unwillingness to see any authority in the NT view of marriage (or apparently in the relationship of Christ to the church). He says,

The NT contains no text where Christ's headship to the church connotes a relationship of authority. Likewise, the NT contains no text where a husband's headship to his wife connotes a relationship of authority. (pp. 248-49)

He then goes on to say that the existence of any authority structure in marriage would "paganize the marriage relationship." Regarding husband/wife relationships, he says,

The imposition of an authority structure upon this exquisite balance of reciprocity would paganize the marriage relationship and make the Christ/church paradigm irrelevant to it. (p. 249)

As far as I can understand this sentence it implies that any existence of authority within marriage is a "pagan" concept because it would "paganize the marriage relationship." Does Dr. Bilezikian mean then that the existence of any authority between parents and children is also a pagan concept? And if the existence of authority within marriage would "make the Christ/church paradigm irrelevant to it," he must mean that there is no authority relationship between Christ and the church either — for if there *were* authority that Christ had over the church, then certainly the paradigm of Christ and the church would not be "irrelevant" to an authority structure within marriage.

What seems to me to be both amazing and disappointing in this statement is the length to which Bilezikian will go in order to carry out his fundamental opposition to the idea of authority within human relationships. A commitment to oppose any idea of the husband's authority over the wife has apparently led him ultimately to say that authority within marriage is always a pagan idea and — it seems — to imply that Christ's authority over the church would be a pagan idea as well.

At this point we must object and insist that authority and submission to authority are not pagan concepts. They are truly divine concepts, rooted in the eternal nature of the Trinity for all eternity, and represented in the eternal submission of the Son to the Father, and the eternal submission of the Holy Spirit to the Father and to the Son. To resist the very idea of authority structures which have been appointed by God (whether in marriage, in the family, in civil government, in church leadership, or in Christ's authority over the church) is ultimately to encourage us to disobey God's will and will only drive us away from conformity to the image of Christ. If we are to live lives pleasing to God, we must rather submit to the authority of our Lord Jesus Christ, whom God has placed "far above all rule and authority and power and dominion, and above every name that is named . . . and has put all things under his feet, and has made him head over all things for the church" (Eph 1:21-22).

6. Catherine Clark Kroeger, "The Classical Concept of Head as 'Source'"

This article by Catherine Kroeger cites many quotations from Greek literature in order to attempt to demonstrate that κεφαλή meant "source" in the ancient world. Many have found this essay persuasive and thought it did what needed to be done; that is, they have read it and concluded that it finally produced *many* examples where κεφαλή clearly means "source," and found these examples in classical Greek literature as well. (Note that the title claims to be considering the "Classical concept" of head as source.)

In response to this article, the first point that must be made is that the essay is wrongly and in fact misleadingly titled. The essay is not at all about "the Classical concept of head as source," but rather should be titled, "The Late Patristic Concept of Head as Source." In fact, four of the six authors Kroeger quotes in order to show that κεφαλή means "source" are taken from the entry in Lampe's *Patristic Greek Lexicon* (p. 749), and the actual quotations she gives in her article are also taken from that entry on κεφαλή.

But are these quotations persuasive? The actual new quotations given in Kroeger's article, in addition to the material from Philo, Artemidorus and the *Orphic Fragments* (all of which have been examined above) include the following six authors (but Kroeger does not mention the date of any of them):

- (1) Athanasius (fifth century AD)
- (2) Cyril of Alexandria (died AD 444)
- (3) Theodore of Moposuestia (died AD 428)
- (4) Basil (the Great) (AD 329-379)
- (5) Eusebius (died AD 339)
- (6) Photius (died AD 891)

We should note that apart from these six later patristic writers, *no new metaphorical uses of κεφαλή are cited in Kroeger's article.*

This means that in her article full of extensive citations of Greek texts, an article which therefore gives the *appearance* of extensive citations of "Classical" Greek literature before the time of the NT, Kroeger has misleadingly claimed in her title to be giving such evidence (whereas in fact the Classical period in Greek literature ended long before the time of the NT). She has also concealed that fact from readers by failing to give any dates for the patristic writers that she quotes.

Since all the additional examples cited come from the fourth century AD and later, it does not seem that they are very helpful for determining NT usage, especially in light of Ruth Tucker's research showing that *earlier* Fathers took κεφαλή to mean "au-

thority" and not "source."⁷⁶ Here it is appropriate to quote what Berkeley and Alvera Mickelsen say about such late material: "Our question is *not* what *kephalē* meant in AD 500 but rather what Paul meant when he used *kephalē* in writing his letters to the churches in the first century."⁷⁷

Yet another highly misleading aspect of Dr. Kroeger's quotations is that she translates them in such a way that it appears that the authors are defining head to mean "source," whereas that is not at all a necessary translation. For example, she translates a quotation from Cyril of Alexandria as follows:

Therefore of our race he become first *head*, which is *source*, and was of the earth and earthy. Since Christ was named the second Adam, he has been placed as *head*, which is *source*, of those who through him have been formed anew unto him unto immortality through sanctification in the spirit [*sic*]. Therefore he himself our *source*, which is *head*, has appeared as a human being . . . Because *head means source*, He establishes the truth for those who are wavering in their mind that man is the head of woman, for she was taken out of him. (p. 268)

Kroeger then says, "In case you have lost count, *kephalē* is defined as 'source' (*archē*) no less than four times in this single paragraph" (p. 269).

What Kroeger fails to tell the reader is that in every one of these sentences where she renders "head, which is source," we could also translate the word ἀρχή as "ruler" or "leader" or "beginning" (without any connotation of source). The texts would then all read, "head, which is ruler." Kroeger fails to tell the reader that these texts are still somewhat ambiguous, because the word ἀρχή can mean either "beginning" or "ruler, authority."⁷⁸

Moreover, several of the quotations which Kroeger gives regarding authors who comment on 1 Cor 11:3 are from orthodox writers who were involved in the great Trinitarian controversy of the fourth and fifth century AD. None of them would have said that God the Father was the "source of being" of God the Son in any sense that would have meant that the Son was created. Yet we should note that in 1 Cor 11:3 Kroeger and many others who argue for the meaning "source" must have the meaning "source of being" in order for Christ to be the "head of every man" and the man to be the "head of the woman" in reference to Adam and Eve. But this sense

⁷⁶See above, p. 50.

⁷⁷"What does *kephalē* mean?" 100.

⁷⁸See BAGD, 112; Lampe, 235-36; LSJ, 252, for ἀρχή meaning "ruler, leader, authority." For the texts which Kroeger quotes from Chrysostom and Athanasius, the translations given in Philip Schaff, ed., *A Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church* (28 vols. in two series [1886-1900]; reprint ed., Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1952ff), are not "source" (as Kroeger translates) but "first principle" (Chrysostom, *Homily 26* on 1 Cor 11, *NPNE*, first series, 12:151, col. 2) and "beginning" (Athanasius, *De Synodis 27:26*, *NPNE*, second series, 4:465, col 2).

of "source" will simply not fit any orthodox conception of 1 Cor 11:3, for then it would mean that the Son was created. How could these quotations mean that God was the source of Christ in that sense, when no orthodox writer would have said anything that implied that the Father created the Son?

Furthermore, even if one were to grant that Kroeger has found some examples where κεφαλή takes the meaning source, the point still remains that there is no instance of "source" *apart from authority*. For example, the Son is never said to be the "head" of the Father, nor is the wife ever said to be the "head" of the husband. The conclusion is that "head" again (and as in all the earlier cases) always applies to the one with greatest authority, and even if one sees a nuance of "source" in some of these texts, the nuance of authority inevitably goes with it.

Another line of argument in Dr. Kroeger's article is the listing of many examples in which the *physical head* of a person is seen as the "source" of various things such as hair, nasal secretions, ear-wax, and so forth (pp. 269-73). Kroeger asks, do these texts not show that "head" could mean "source" in Greek literature?

No, they do not show that at all. These simply refer to the physical head of persons and describe *functions* that can be observed. These texts do not use κεφαλή in a metaphorical sense to mean source. We can see that if we try to substitute the word "source" in a statement like some of those mentioned in Kroeger's article: might someone say (for example), "I see luxuriant hair growing from your *source* today"? Or might someone say, "Your *source* is giving off abundant nasal secretions this morning"? Certainly those statements would be nonsense and they show that "source" was not a suitable *meaning* or synonym for "head" in any of those statements.

7. (1987) Gordon D. Fee, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians*

This treatment of 1 Cor 11:3, and particularly the meaning of κεφαλή in that text, quotes the 1954 article by S. Bedale, and then quotes the recent articles discussed above by the Mickelsens, Philip Payne, and Catherine Kroeger. Regarding Kroeger's paper on the "Classical concept of head as source," Fee calls this "a paper that appears to be decisive" (p. 502). In addition, from Payne's article Fee quotes the statement from *Orphic Fragments* 21a, the two quotations from Philo, and the quotations from Artemidorus.

Fee concludes that κεφαλή in the sense of "chief" or "person of highest rank" is "rare in Greek literature" (p. 502). He says, "Paul's understanding of the metaphor, therefore, and almost certainly the only one the Corinthians would have grasped, is 'head' as 'source,' especially 'source of life'" (p. 502). He gives as evidence the quotations noted above. Fee also takes issue with my study of κεφαλή for four reasons:

(1) Of my forty-nine examples, he says twelve are from the NT, and these are examples which Grudem “prejudges exegetically” to mean authority over.

(2) Of the other thirty-seven examples, eighteen are from the Septuagint, “which are exceptions that prove the rule.”

(3) He then says, “For most of the remaining nineteen there is serious exegetical question as to whether the authors intended a metaphorical sense of ‘authority over.’”

(4) He says that Grudem is “quite mistaken” in his use of Philo because two passages in Philo show the meaning “source.”⁷⁹

In response to those four points, the following may be said:

(1) I am not sure what Fee means when he says that I “prejudge exegetically” the NT passages. In my earlier article I discussed each passage. Fee by contrast gives no discussion in return. Is he implying that since my *discussion* concluded that κεφαλή means “authority over,” it is invalid to count these examples? But when Fee provides no exegetical arguments of his own about any other passages than 1 Cor 11:3, one wonders if it is not he who has “prejudged” the meaning of these texts.

(2) As explained above, it is inconsistent to say that eighteen examples from the Septuagint are exceptions “that prove the rule,” and then reject the sense “authority over” which is established by these eighteen examples, but accept κεφαλή as “source” where there are zero examples from the Septuagint.

(3) Fee gives no evidence, no argument, no hint of what these “serious exegetical questions” are in the other citations. His statement is simply dismissal by assertion, with no argument or evidence in support of it.

(4) Regarding the two examples in Philo that speak of a person becoming the “head” of the human race, and speak of the “head” of an animal, the meaning “source” is certainly not clearly established, as was indicated in the discussion above.⁸⁰

Such analysis in a prominent commentary series is disappointing to say the least. The survey above has shown that not only Gordon Fee, but also Kroeger, the Mickelsens, Payne, and Bilezikian all dismiss the meaning “authority over” as “rare,” but say that the meaning “source” is “common.” Perhaps we can be forgiven for realizing that all of these six writers have also been vocal proponents of an “evangelical feminist” position that seeks to deny any unique leadership role for men in marriage or the church, and for wondering if their strong commitment to this viewpoint has affected their judgment on the meaning of κεφαλή.

It is of course possible that my own judgment on this issue is distorted as well, but as I look back on the data once again, it seems strange that they have taken the meaning “authority, ruler” which is attested over forty times in ancient literature, including

⁷⁹These four objections are on pp. 502-03, n. 42.

⁸⁰See above, pp. 30-32.

about sixteen times in the Septuagint, and called it "rare." On the other hand, these authors have taken the meaning "source," for which there is one possible example in the fifth century BC (*Orphic Fragments* 21a), two possible (but ambiguous) examples in Philo, no examples in the Septuagint, and no clear examples applied to persons before or during the time of the NT, and called it a "common, recognizable, ordinary meaning." What kind of logic is this? Forty examples is "rare" but no unambiguous examples is "common"? The meaning "authority over" which is in all NT Greek lexicons is unlikely and rare and "not part of the ordinary range of meanings for the Greek word" but the meaning "source" which is in no lexicon for the NT period, and is reflected in none of the early Fathers who took it to mean "authority," is called "almost certainly the only one the Corinthians would have grasped" (Fee, *1 Corinthians*, 502). I confess that I find it hard to follow this line of reasoning. It seems to me that we have yet to see convincing evidence that κεφαλή actually did mean source at the time of the NT.

8. (1989) *Joseph Fitzmyer, "Another Look at ΚΕΦΑΛΗ in 1 Cor 11:3"*

In this study Fitzmyer,⁸¹ independently of my earlier study, finds a number of examples of κεφαλή meaning "authority or supremacy over someone else" in the Septuagint as well as in Jewish and Christian writings outside of the NT. He concludes,

The upshot of this discussion is that a Hellenistic Jewish writer such as Paul of Tarsus could well have intended that κεφαλή in 1 Cor 11:3 be understood as "head" in the sense of authority or supremacy over someone else. . . . The next edition of the *Greek-English Lexicon* of Liddell-Scott-Jones will have to provide a subcategory within the metaphorical uses of κεφαλή in the sense of "leader, ruler." (pp. 510-11)

9. (1989) *Peter Cotterell and Max Turner, Linguistics and Biblical Interpretation*

Here Cotterell and Turner express substantial agreement with my earlier study.⁸² With regard to the suggestion of some that κεφαλή can mean "source," they note the absence of any examples of κεφαλή that cannot be explained by other established meanings and have to be explained by the meaning "source." They ask:

And where have we evidence of this? Where do we find instances of such statements as "cows are the *kephalē* of milk"; "Egypt is the *kephalē* of papyrus", etc. Only such a range of evidence could

⁸¹Fitzmyer is primarily responding to claims by R. Scroggs and J. Murphy-O'Connor that κεφαλή means "source" in 1 Cor 11:3.

⁸²See above, p. 15, n. 12, for their comment on Herodotus 4.91.

confirm that *kephalē* had the lexical sense "source" or "origin," generally understood, rather than being specifically collocated with nouns referring to linear entities that have two ends. And we do not appear to have this kind of evidence. (p. 143)

They conclude, "We are not aware of any instance of 'head' unambiguously used with the sense 'source' before the third century AD. . . . As far as we can tell, 'source' or 'origin' was not a conventional sense of the word *kephalē* in Paul's time" (pp. 144-45).

10. *Recent Lexicons by Bauer (1988) and Louw-Nida (1988)*

As noted above, since my previous article, two more NT lexicons have been published, both of which list for κεφαλή meanings such as "chief, leader" ("*Oberhaupt*"),⁸³ "one who is of supreme or pre-eminent status, in view of authority to order or command — 'one who is the head of, one who is superior to, one who is supreme over',"⁸⁴ but they give no meaning such as "source, origin."

IV. CONCLUSION

The meaning "ruler, authority over" is still found quite clearly in forty-one ancient texts from both biblical and extra-biblical literature, and is possible in two or more other texts. In addition, there are six texts where κεφαλή refers to the literal head of a person's body and is said to be the part that rules or governs the rest of the body, and there are two texts which are similes where a ruler or leader is said to be like a head. But four of the examples I previously adduced were shown to be illegitimate by subsequent studies, and those should no longer be counted as valid examples. In addition, all the lexicons that specialize in the NT period, including two very recent ones, list the meaning "ruler, authority over" for κεφαλή — it appears to be a well-established and valid meaning during the NT period.

On the other hand, the evidence for the meaning "source" is far weaker, and it is fair to say that the meaning has not yet been established. There are some texts which indicate that the physical head was thought of as the source of energy or life for the body, and therefore the possibility exists that the word κεφαλή might have come to be used as a metaphor for "source" or "source of life." There are two texts in Philo and one in the *Orphic Fragments* where such a meaning is possible, but it is not certain, and the meaning "leader, ruler" would fit these texts as well. There are still no *unambiguous* examples before or during the time of the NT in which κεφαλή has the metaphorical sense "source," and no lexicon specializing in the NT period lists such a meaning, nor does the

⁸³Griechisch-deutsches Wörterbuch (6th ed.) 874-5.

⁸⁴Greek-English Lexicon (ed. Louw and Nida) 1:739.

Liddell and Scott lexicon list such a meaning as applied to persons or as applied to things that are not also the endpoint of something else. In fact, we may well ask those who advocate the meaning "source" an important question: Where is even one clear example of κεφαλή used of a *person* to mean "source" in all of Greek literature before or during the time of the New Testament? Is there even *one* example that is unambiguous?

Moreover, even if the meaning "source" or (as Cervin and Liefeld propose) "prominent part" were adopted for some examples of the word κεφαλή, we would still have no examples of "source" or "prominent part" *without the additional nuance of authority or rule*. Even in the texts where "source" or "prominent part" is alleged as the correct meaning, the person who is called "head" is always a person in leadership or authority. Therefore there is no linguistic basis for proposing that the NT texts which speak of Christ as the head of the church or the husband as the head of the wife can rightly be read apart from the attribution of authority to the one designated as "head."



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